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Abstract
Why is it that criminal cases nearly always settle, but habeas corpus cases do
not? The vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas, without a
trial. But it is the rare habeas petition that is resolved out of court, rather than
litigated to completion. This is an interesting puzzle because criminal and habeas
corpus cases have a lot in common. They involve the same parties and the same
attorneys. They also involve similar bargains: the defendant or prisoner receives
a shorter, more certain sentence and the prosecutor or government attorney avoids
having to litigate a criminal or habeas case, respectively. This is an important
puzzle because active settlement of habeas cases could reduce habeas caseloads
by nearly one-third. Although most habeas petitions are sure-losers under current
law, I estimate that at least 28 percent are sufﬁciently credible – or costly for the
government to defend – that they warrant settlement.
I attempt to resolve this puzzle and propose a series of reforms to pave the way
for more active (but safe) settlement of habeas cases. Most notably, I propose that
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be modiﬁed to permit courts
to amend sentences upon a habeas settlement, regardless of whether the modiﬁed
sentence is within the sentencing guideline range for the prisoner’s offense. And,
to ensure that any growth in habeas settlements is not at the expense of prisoners’
rights, I propose that courts be required to conduct Rule 11-type colloquies with




Why is it that criminal cases nearly always settle, but habeas 
corpus cases do not?  The vast majority of criminal cases are resolved 
by guilty pleas, without a trial.  But it is the rare habeas petition that 
is resolved out of court, rather than litigated to completion.  This is an 
interesting puzzle because criminal and habeas corpus cases have a 
lot in common.  They involve the same parties and the same attor-
neys.  They also involve similar bargains: the defendant or prisoner 
receives a shorter, more certain sentence and the prosecutor or gov-
ernment attorney avoids having to litigate a criminal or habeas case, 
respectively.  This is an important puzzle because active settlement of 
habeas cases could reduce habeas caseloads by nearly one-third.  Al-
though most habeas petitions are sure-losers under current law, I es-
timate that at least 28 percent are sufficiently credible – or costly for 
the government to defend – that they warrant settlement.   
I attempt to resolve this puzzle and propose a series of reforms 
to pave the way for more active (but safe) settlement of habeas cases.  
Most notably, I propose that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure be modified to permit courts to amend sentences upon a 
habeas settlement, regardless of whether the modified sentence is 
within the sentencing guideline range for the prisoner’s offense.  And, 
to ensure that any growth in habeas settlements is not at the expense 
of prisoners’ rights, I propose that courts be required to conduct Rule 
11-type colloquies with prisoners before accepting habeas settle-
ments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why is it that criminal cases nearly always settle, but habeas 
corpus cases do not?  The vast majority of criminal cases are resolved 
by guilty pleas, without a trial.  But it is the rare habeas petition that 
is resolved out of court, rather than litigated to completion. 
This is an interesting puzzle because criminal and habeas cor-
pus cases have a lot in common.  They involve the same parties and 
the same attorneys.  Prosecutors who actively negotiate plea agree-
ments in criminal cases are very often the attorneys responsible for 
defending the government in habeas cases.  The public defenders 
who actively negotiate pleas on behalf of their clients are nearly al-
ways prisoner’s counsel in credible habeas cases.  Settlement of 
criminal and habeas cases also involve similar bargains: the defen-
dant or prisoner receives a shorter, more certain sentence and the 
prosecutor or government attorney avoids having to litigate a crimi-
nal or habeas case, respectively. 
This is an important puzzle because active settlement of ha-
beas cases could reduce habeas caseloads by nearly one-third.  Al-
though most habeas petitions are sure-losers under current law, I es-
timate that at least 28 percent are sufficiently credible – or costly for 
the government to defend – that they warrant settlement.  These cases 
include ones where petitioners are appointed counsel by the court; 
win at least one vote to grant, even though they are ultimately denied; 
or are ultimately granted at the state or federal level.  (This last cate-
gory alone accounts for 8 percent of cases.)  Moreover, habeas set-
tlements are as valid under the constitution as plea bargains because 
the former involve rights no more important than those waived by the 
latter.   
In this paper I attempt to resolve this puzzle and propose a se-
ries to reforms to pave the way for active (but safe) settlement of ha-
beas cases.  Based on extensive interviews with prosecutors and pub-
lic defenders, as well as statistical analysis of data on habeas filings 
and judgments, I identify three primary obstacles to habeas settle-
ments.  First, parties to habeas cases simply do not think to settle.  
There is no culture of out-of-court, private resolution of habeas 
claims.  This is not to suggest that there is opposition to compromise: 
most attorneys interviewed said they would welcome settlement, but 
it had just never come up.  Second, in cases where settlement is con-
sidered, rigidities in the federal sentencing guidelines often rule out 
any reasonable compromise.  The reason is that even sentences aris-
ing from habeas settlements must comply with sentencing guidelines, 
and many compromises lie outside the guidelines range for the crime 
that the prisoner committed.  (This hurdle may be cleared if Blakely 
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1 invalidates sentencing guidelines.  But it could persist 
if, instead, prosecutors simply submit sentencing factors to juries.)  A 
third obstacle to habeas settlements is that few state and no federal 
courts have the authority revise a prisoner’s sentence after a habeas 
filing and settlement.  Therefore, to implement habeas settlements, 
government attorneys have to concede a prisoner’s habeas claims on 
the condition that the prisoner pleads to a lesser-included crime.  The 
need to maintain good relations with police – or simply pride – often 
prevents prosecutors from making such a concession and thus im-
plementing a settlement. 
There are two basic reforms that would, for the most part, 
eliminate these obstacles to settlement.  One is that training programs 
for prosecutors and public defenders should include modules on ha-
beas settlements just they currently include modules on plea bargain-
ing.  The other reform is that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, and its state analogues, should be amended to permit 
courts, upon the government’s motion, to amend a prisoner’s sen-
tence if the prisoner drops her habeas claims, regardless of whether 
the new sentence conforms to sentencing guidelines.   
Just as the bargaining power asymmetries raise concerns 
about prosecutors taking advantage of defendants in plea negotia-
tions, they also raise concerns about government attorneys exploiting 
prisoners in habeas settlement talks.  Therefore, in order to ensure 
that habeas compromises are fair to defendants, I recommend two 
additional reforms.  Following Rule 11, which requires that courts 
conduct a formal colloquy with defendants to ensure they understand 
the implication of their guilty pleas, Rule 35 and it analogues at the 
state level should be amended to require similar colloquies with pris-
oners to ensure they understand the implications of any habeas set-
tlement that they sign.  This reform is uniquely important because 
most of the habeas settlements I have uncovered are oral contracts, 
which are difficult to reconstruct and enforce.  The second reform is 
that courts should always permit prisoners to challenge a habeas set-
tlement on the grounds that it was not voluntary and knowing be-
cause the prisoner received ineffective assistance of counsel with re-
gard to the settlement.  There is little reason to fear that this excep-
tion would negate the value of habeas settlements to government at-
torneys because the use of Rule 11-type colloquies to vet settlements 
would render facially baseless most complaints about ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. 
Before diving into a discussion of habeas settlements, it is 
important to distinguish them from a related phenomenon: so-called 
                                                                                                                 
1 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). 
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“habeas waivers.”  These are clauses in plea agreements that waive, 
in addition to a defendant’s right to a trial, the defendant’s right to 
collaterally challenge her conviction.  In other words, habeas waivers 
occur during plea bargaining, before a defendant files a habeas peti-
tion, and they bar the defendant from ever filing a habeas petition.  
By contrast, habeas settlements occur after a prisoner files her habeas 
petition and resemble ordinary out-of-court settlements of criminal or 
other civil cases.  The relationship between habeas settlements and 
habeas petitions is analogous to the relationship between plea agree-
ments and an indictment, but it is habeas waivers, not habeas settle-
ments, that are part of the plea bargaining process.   
Although this paper – to be thorough – also examines why 
habeas waivers are less common than waivers of trial rights in plea 
agreements, I do not advocate the use of habeas waivers.  The reason 
is that there are no gains to trade with habeas waivers.  Habeas waiv-
ers purchase defendants only trivial reductions in sentence because 
defendants who plead guilty retain few procedural rights that can be 
vindicated on collateral review and generally receive sentences that 
expire before the habeas review can be completed.  Moreover, habeas 
waivers offer prosecutors little respite from habeas litigation because 
a small percentage of all habeas petitions are filed by prisoners who 
pleaded guilty and habeas petitions by such prisoners are truly never 
granted.   
The remainder of this paper may be outlined as follows.  Be-
cause the case law on habeas waivers sets benchmarks against which 
the legality of habeas settlements are judged, Section I offers a brief 
account of the prevalence and enforceability of habeas waivers.  It 
also expands on why such waivers are of little value to defendants or 
prosecutors.  Section II returns to the primary focus of this paper, and 
examines prevalence and enforceability of habeas settlements.  Sec-
tion III discusses the constitutional validity and the policy benefits of 
settlement to parties in habeas litigation.  It follows up by recom-
mending procedural reforms to promote habeas settlements.  The 
conclusion takes up the benefits of habeas settlements that flow to 
courts and the quality of habeas case law.  Appendix A provides ex-
amples of habeas settlement agreements.  Appendix B summarizes 
the data employed by the analysis in Sections I and II.  Appendix C 
complements Section III with text for an amendment to Rule 35 that 
would give courts the authority to review and implement habeas set-
tlements.
2
                                                                                                                 
2 In order to place it in academic context, this paper can be said to advance the literature on state 
and federal habeas review in three ways.  It is, to the best of my knowledge, the first paper to discuss the 
settlement of habeas petitions after they are filed.  Second, it is the first to conduct a nationwide survey 
to determine the prevalence of both habeas waivers and habeas settlements.  Third, Appendix B offers 
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I.  HABEAS WAIVERS 
Defendants can trade their habeas corpus rights for sentencing 
concessions from prosecutors at either of two points during the 
criminal process (see Figure 1).  They can be traded before trial, as 
part of a plea bargain.  In exchange for a further reduction in her sen-
tence, the defendant could waive, in addition to her right to trial, her 
right to collaterally attack her conviction in a habeas petition.  Such 
agreements may be called “habeas waivers.”  Alternatively, if the de-
fendant opts for trial, is convicted and sentenced, and then files a ha-
beas petition, she may surrender her habeas claim in return for a 
downward adjustment to her sentence before the courts complete 
their adjudication of her habeas petition.  I refer to these latter ar-
rangements as “habeas settlements.”  Note that habeas waivers and 
habeas settlements are mutually excusive.  If a defendant signs a ha-
beas waiver, she cannot file a habeas petition.  But without a habeas 
petition, there are no claims to motivate a habeas settlement.   
Although the aim of this paper is to explain habeas settlements, 
this first section focuses on habeas waivers.  This is not merely be-
cause habeas waivers precede habeas settlements in the criminal 
process or because their mutual exclusivity means the prevalence of 
habeas waivers may partially explain the paucity habeas settlements.  
It is also because the case law on habeas waivers sets the benchmarks 
against which the legal validity of settlements is judged.  This, in 
turn, is because the case law on habeas waivers is better developed 
than that on habeas settlements. Moreover, habeas waivers, which 
surrender the right to challenge errors in the criminal process before 
they occur, are in some sense more provocative than habeas settle-
ments, which surrender the right to challenge procedural errors that 
have already occurred. 
                                                                                                                 
the first detailed examination of outcomes in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases after the Anti-terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).  This analysis is based on a detailed study of nearly 300 cases filed in 
the Eastern District of New York in 2001-2002 and gathered by Marc Falkoff, the special master ap-
pointed by Judge Jack Weinstein to handle a backlog of habeas cases in that district.  It is also the first to 
employ prisoner release data (as opposed to merely sentencing data), assembled by John Pfaff, to con-
struct a more accurate estimate of the number of prisoners with effective habeas rights. 
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This section begins with some examples of habeas waivers, and 
then discusses the enforceability of these waivers.  I proceed to sur-
vey and explain patterns in the usage of habeas waivers.  In the end, 
however, my investigation suggests that habeas waivers do not pro-
vide sufficient value to defendants or prosecutors to warrant a policy 
of promoting such agreements.  The data for the discussion in this 
section and the next are drawn from a nationwide survey of state and 
federal prosecutors and public defenders.  This survey was answered 
by parties to criminal and habeas litigation in 23 states and 41 federal 
districts.
3  Approximately 10 percent of the survey relies on open-
ended phone conversations with respondents.  The remainder is based 
on a formal survey instrument filled out by respondents over the 
phone or by fax. 




(if not waived) 
Sentencing  Sentencing 
Trial  Guilty plea  
(and habeas waiver?) 
Defendant indicted 
                                                                                                                 
3 The states which responded are Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Il-
linois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.  The federal dis-
tricts that responded are S.D. Ala., D. Alaska, D. Ariz., E.D. Ark., W.D. Ark. C.D. Cal., E.D., Cal., N.D. 
Cal., D. Colo., D. Conn., D. Ha., D. Idaho, S.D. Ill., D. D.C., N.D. Fla., E.D. La., M.D. La., W.D. La., 
W.D. Mich., D. Minn., E.D., Mo., W.D. Mo., D. Nev., E.D. N.C., D. N.J., D. N.M., N.D. N.Y., W.D. 
N.Y., E.D. Okla., N.D. Okla., W.D. Okla., D. Ore., M.D. Penn., D. S.D., E.D. Tex., M.D. Tex., S.D. Tex., 
D. Utah, D. Vt., D. Wash., and D. Wyo. 
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A.  Examples 
Consider initially the case of U.S. v. Nicoloff.
4  The defendant, a 
convicted felon, was arrested in Oklahoma while in possession of a 
firearm.  She was charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a) 
(2003) and pleaded guilty rather than risk trial.  Importantly, her 
agreement with the prosecutor stipulated that  
[t]he defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights, including 
any and all collateral attacks including but not limited to those 
pursued by means of a writ of habeas corpus, save and except 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
5
This is a fairly standard example of a habeas waiver.  It surrenders 
the right to collateral review of a defendant’s sentence except in the 
case where the defendant challenges the effectiveness of defense 
counsel.  (The value of this exception should not be overstated since 
every jurisdiction that enforces habeas waivers has carved an implicit 
exception for ineffective assistance claims that attack the voluntary-
and-knowing nature of the plea agreement.)   
It is difficult to determine from the text of most plea agreements 
how much prosecutors agree to reduce a defendant’s sentence in re-
turn for a habeas waiver.  There is typically a list of concessions by 
the defendant followed by a list of concessions by the prosecutor, 
with no express language connecting specific concessions by each 
side.  Occasionally, however, habeas waivers are made conditional on 
a certain sentence.  This sheds some light on the marginal contribu-
tion of the habeas waiver to the defendant’s welfare.  Consider the 
following example from a plea agreement arising out a felon-in-
possession indictment in Minnesota: 
In the event that the Court accepts the plea agreement, including 
the guidelines calculations set out in paragraph 5, and sentences 
the defendant at or below the guidelines range for an offense 
level of 17 and a criminal history of III, the defendant waives his 
right to appeal or to contest, directly or collaterally, his sentence 
on any ground, with the exception of the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, unless the Court should impose a sentence 
in violation of the law apart from the sentencing guidelines.
6
                                                                                                                 
4 U.S. v. Nicoloff, No. 03-CR-109-K (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
5 Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Nicoloff, No. 03-CR-109-K (N.D. Okla. 2003), at 3 (§(A)(2)(b)).  This 
agreement was provided by Julie O’Connell, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Oklahoma, 
Dec. 3, 2003.   
6 Plea Agreement and Sentencing Stipulations, United States of America v. Robert Michael Martin, 
No. 03-109 (02), D. Minn., [Date] at 6 (¶ 8). 
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In this case the parties disagreed on the proper sentence for the de-
fendant under the federal sentencing guidelines.  The defendant 
thought he deserved a sentence of 30-37 months as implied by an of-
fense level of 17 for a defendant in criminal history category III.  The 
prosecutor believed the defendant deserved a sentence of 46-57 
months as implied by an offense level of 21 and criminal history 
category III.
7  Thus the agreement suggests that the defendant was 
willing to exchange his appellate and habeas rights for a sentence less 
than 37 months rather than one greater than 46 months.   
The reader has surely noted that both agreements above involve 
waivers of both appellate and habeas rights.  This appears to be true 
of all the plea agreements.  Some plea bargains contain appellate 
waivers without habeas waivers, but I have found none that contain a 
habeas waiver without an appellate waiver.  Moreover, none of the 
defense attorneys or prosecutors I interviewed could recall a plea 
agreement with only a waiver of collateral review rights.
8   
B.  Legal status and scope 
Habeas waivers have been accepted in all jurisdictions but one 
(Indiana) that has considered them.
9  That said, I have found a hand-
                                                                                                                 
7 United States Sentencing Guideline Manual, Ch. 5 pt. A at 632 (2003) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). 
8 Finally, while most habeas waivers in plea agreements are the product of an exchange of collateral 
review rights for marginal reductions in sentence, there are cases where parties say a habeas waiver’s 
primary purpose is to secure compliance with the remainder of the contract rather than secure additional 
sentence reductions.  For example, if the parties agree that, given the uncertainty of conviction, the ex-
pected sentence for a defendant is less than the statutory minimum for the crime he has committed, no 
deal may be possible if the defendant pleads to that crime.  A deal may be possible, however, if the de-
fendant pleads to a different crime that he has not technically committed but that permits a sentence that 
approximates the expected sentence were the defendant to go to trial for the crime he did commit.  The 
difficulty is that such a plea agreement is vulnerable to a collateral challenge on the grounds that the de-
fendant is innocent of the crime to which he pleaded.  The defendant would have to demonstrate the plea 
was involuntary or unintelligent because of, e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel, but the risk that the 
plea agreement will unravel is greater than zero.  To eliminate this risk, parties will agree to habeas 
waivers.  As in waiver-for-sentence bargains, however, such plea agreements contain both appellate and 
habeas waivers.  Unlike waiver-for-sentence bargains, such agreements do not contain appellate waivers 
without habeas waivers.  Telephone interview with Daniel Scott, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Dis-
trict of Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2003); Telephone conversation with Ahilan Arulanantham, Assistant Federal 
Public Defender, Western District of Texas (Nov. 20, 2003). 
9 Garcia-Santos v. U.S., 273 F.3d 506, 508-509 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th 
Cir.1993) (per curiam); U.S. v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Watson v. U.S., 165 F.3d 486, 
488-89 (6th Cir. 1999); Mason v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000); DeRoo v. U.S., 223 F.3d 
919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Cockerham, 237 
F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 2001); Allen v. Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 670-671 (11th Cir. 1998); Boglin v. 
State, 840 So.2d 926, 929-930  (Ala. 2002); Allen v. Thomas, 458 S.E.2d 107, 108 (Ga. 1995).  Indiana 
rejects habeas waivers, though such a waiver does not void the entire plea.  See Majors, 568 N.E.2d at 
1067-68.  It is likely that other jurisdictions which reject appellate waivers – Arizona and certain juris-
dictions in Michigan – would reject habeas waivers, if for no other reason than that most jurisdictions 
that permit habeas waivers do so because they liken habeas waivers to appellate waivers, which they en-
force. 
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ful of examples where federal district courts have held that a habeas 
waiver bars a petitioner’s habeas claims, but nonetheless addressed 
those claims on the merits.
10  These cases will probably dwindle as 
habeas waivers become more commonplace.  Finally, at least one dis-
trict court has held – in an unpublished memorandum opinion – that 
if a prisoner files a habeas petition despite a habeas waiver in his 
plea, the prosecution may treat the plea agreement as having been 
breached by the prisoner.
11
Because a habeas waiver is supplements a guilty plea, in order to 
determine the scope of rights that can be relinquished by the waiver, 
one must determine which rights remain after the guilty plea.  When 
a defendant agrees to plead guilty, whether as part of an agreement 
with the prosecutor or not, she waives her right to a trial
12 and causes 
the criminal process to skip the trial phase.  The plea also has impli-
cations for post-trial phases.  Most importantly, a plea generally 
waives the right to challenge on appeal or collateral review all consti-
tutional errors predating the plea.
13  This waiver may be called the 
Tollett rule, for the Supreme Court case that established it.
14  The 
scope of this waiver is described in Table 1. 
Even when a defendant pleads guilty, she retains the right to 
raise certain claims on appeal.  These claims can be partitioned into 
two groups.  The first group includes claims that the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to convict the defendant or that the sentence im-
posed was otherwise illegal.
15  The first group also includes any chal-
lenge that the defendant’s plea was not voluntary and knowing,
16 e.g., 
because its terms were ambiguous, the court failed to inform him of 
its salient terms, or defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
with regard to the plea.
17   
The second group of claims includes challenges based on certain 
narrow pre-plea rights, such as the right to protection from prosecuto-
rial vindictiveness or the privilege against double jeopardy.
18  The 
                                                                                                                 
10 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. U.S., 2003 WL 21638079 (S.D.N.Y.). 
11 U.S. v. Schaffer, 2002 WL 31748619 (N.D.Ill. 2002). 
12 See, e.g., Fed. R. of Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3) (enumerating the rights the court must explain to the de-
fendant are waived by a guilty plea).   
13 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (involving waiver of claim of discrimination 
in the selection of the grand jury).   
14 Id. 
15 U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); Fireman v. U.S., 20 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (D. Mass 
1998). 
16 Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).   
17 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-770 (1970).   
18 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (upholding a collateral attack on a guilty plea by a 
defendant who was re-indicted on felony charges following his appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, on 
the grounds that the re-indictment was the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness); Menna v. New York, 
423 U.S. 61, 62, 63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (acknowledging that, while a plea agreement that includes a 
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second group also includes claims based on certain statutory excep-
tions to the Tollett rule.
19  For example, in California and New York 
the defendant may raise claims challenging trial court decisions on 
motions to suppress specific evidence.
20  A final set of claims in the 
second group includes those challenging any errors made by the trial 
court in determining the defendant’s sentence.
21  
Although a plea agreement does not bar appeals based on claims 
in either group above, courts will permit the defendant to waive his 
rights to appeal claims in the second group.
22  Such appellate waivers 
are accepted in all but three states – Arizona, Indiana, and Michigan – 
and all federal districts except the District of Columbia.
23  For certain 
claims, such as prosecutorial vindictiveness and double jeopardy, 
however, that the Supreme Court has said survive the plea and claims 
                                                                                                                 
specific double jeopardy waiver waives any double jeopardy claims, a general plea does not automati-
cally do so). 
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court appears to have backed off, though not over-
ruled, the decisions that created these exceptions to the Tollett rule.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 363, 365 (1978) (rejecting claim of vindictiveness where prosecutor threatened to reindict defen-
dant on more serious charges if he did not plead to existing charges, because competent counsel pro-
tected defendant from prosecutors and prosecutor’s statements were interpreted as only presenting de-
fendant with the legal risks of failing to plead); Broce, 488 U.S. at 569 (rejecting claim of double jeop-
ardy where defendants plead to two conspiracies but district court found in a subsequent, related case 
that there had been only one conspiracy, because the plea was counseled and voluntary). 
19 Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 291-293 (1975) (permitting such statutory exemptions to 
the Tollet rule).  Note that the plea agreement may also permit with specific language the defendant to 
challenge certain pre-plea errors. 
20 Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 2002); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.20(1) (McKinney 1998).  
A 1989 study by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) found that appeals based on these statu-
tory exceptions account for a significant percentage of appeals.  Specifically, it noted that appeals from 
guilty pleas and other non-trial dispositions averaged between 14 percent and 25 percent of all appeals 
in states without statutory exceptions to the Tollett rule and 43 percent of appeals in certain California 
and New York jurisdictions.  National Center for State Courts, Understanding Reversible Error in 
Criminal Appeals 31, 44 n. 8 (1989). 
21 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hahn, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 4230 (10th Cir.). 
22 See, e.g., U.S. v. White, 258 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling that appellate waiver does not imply 
waiver of right not to be imprisoned for legal conduct). 
With respect to sentencing errors, most federal courts permit all sentencing error expressly to be 
waived on appeal even though the nature of the error was unknown to the defendant at the time of the 
plea and appellate waiver.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Melancon, 
972 F.2d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990).  Califor-
nia permits sentencing error to be waived only if the language of the appellate waiver is specific.  See 
People v. Vargas, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 
25-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  Only Minnesota does not allow any appellate waiver of sentencing errors.  
Ballweber v. State, 457 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
23 See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Validity and Effect of Criminal Defendant’s Waiver of Right to 
Appeal as Part of Negotiated Plea Agreement, 89 Amer. L. Rep. 3d 864, § 3[a] (1979). 
Appellate waivers are per se unenforceable only in Arizona and Indiana.  See State v. Ethington, 
592 P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979); Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  They are question-
able in Michigan.  Compare People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. App. 1972) (appellate waiver un-
enforceable), and People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. App. 1975) (same), with People v. Rod-
riguez, 480 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting reasoning in Butler).   
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falling under statutory exemptions to the Tollett rule, the waiver lan-
guage must be specific to the claim in order to be enforceable.
24  
Moreover, appellate waivers, like plea agreements, are not enforce-
able if the waiver was not voluntary and knowing,
25 perhaps because 
the defendant received ineffective advice of counsel with respect to 
the waiver.
26  Where a waiver is held invalid, the remedy is typically 
to allow the appeal to proceed, perhaps with the prosecutor also given 
the option to void the plea bargain.
27  Finally, appellate waivers do 
not bar prisoners from raising claims from either group in a state or 
federal PCR motion, to the extent that such claims are not proce-
durally barred.   
Appellate waivers are important to habeas waivers for two rea-
sons.  First, because courts that approve of habeas waivers analogize 
them to appellate waivers, the scope of rights that they can surrender 
is likely the same as the scope surrendered in appellate waivers.   
Specifically, they can waive claims based on certain narrow pre-plea 
rights, such as the right to protection from prosecutorial vindictive-
ness or the privilege against double jeopardy; claims based on state 
statutory exceptions to the Tollett rule; and claims asserting sentenc-
ing errors.  They cannot waive claims that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to convict the defendant; claims that the sentence im-
posed was otherwise illegal; and claims that the defendant’s plea was 
not voluntary and knowing.  Moreover, to be enforceable, habeas 
waivers like appellate waivers must themselves be knowing and vol-
untary,
28 a condition that requires the defendant to have received ef-
fective assistance of counsel with regard to the habeas waiver.
29  
Where a habeas waiver is invalidated, the prisoner may proceed with 
                                                                                                                 
24 People v. Williams, 331 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1975) (involving waiver of right to appeal deci-
sion regarding suppression motion); People v. Charles, 217 Cal. Rptr. 402, 409 (Ct. App. 1985) (same); 
U.S. v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (10th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 114 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
25 Courts have, in specific instances, held appellate waivers invalid where relevant language in the 
plea was ambiguous, see, e.g., U.S. v. Joseph, 38 Fed. Appx. 667 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that waiver was 
ambiguous); U.S. v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that amount of restitution required 
under plea agreement was ambiguous); or the court’s plea colloquy failed properly to inform the defen-
dant that as part of the plea agreement he had agreed to waive the right to appeal or was otherwise de-
fective, see, e.g., U.S. v. Benson, 63 Fed. Appx. 88 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that court failed address 
waiver during plea colloquy); U.S. v. Normand, 58 Fed. Appx. 679 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that court 
mistakenly informed defendant he had a right to appeal); U.S. v. Portillo-Cano, 192 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 
1999) (finding plea colloquy was otherwise defective). 
26 See, e.g., Jiminez v. U.S., 168 F.Supp.2d 79 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).   
27 Majors, 568 N.E.2d at 1068 (permitting the appeal to proceed); Gibson, 348 A.2d 769, 775 (N.J. 
1975) (permitting the appeal to proceed and the prosecutor to void the plea bargain).  But see Butler, 
204 N.W.2d at 331 (voiding the conviction). 
28 See, e.g., Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1183; Allen, 458 S.E.2d at 108.   
29 See, e.g., Craig, 985 F.2d at 178; Boglin, 840 So.2d at 931.  See also U.S. v. Steadman, 198 
F.Supp.2d 730, 733-34 (2002) (habeas waiver not enforceable because judge failed to mention it during 
the plea colloquy). 
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her post-conviction review (PCR) or habeas claims.
30  (I shall use the 
terms PCR and habeas interchangeably.) 
Second, as mentioned in the Section I.A, every habeas waiver I 
have found has been accompanied by an appellate waiver.  This is 
important because appellate waivers render a habeas waiver far less 
valuable.  Most states require that a prisoner raise her PCR claims on 
direct appeal unless this procedural default can be excused.  The fed-
eral government has an analogous rule requiring the exhaustion of all 
state remedies – whether a direct appeal or a state PCR motion – be-
fore a claim may be brought in a federal habeas petition.  Exhaustion 
may be excused at the federal level for either the reasons that excuse 
exhaustion at the state level or because the state remedies are inade-
quate.  Although the law on the interaction between appellate and ha-
beas waivers is not yet firm, a number of state and federal courts 
have held that an appellate waiver does not excuse the exhaustion re-
                                                                                                                 
Status Claims 
Waived by plea    Right to trial (and thus trial-type errors) 
  Most errors predating the plea 
  Certain double-jeopardy and prosecutorial vindictiveness 
claims (if waiver is specific) 
Not waived by plea, but 
may be waived by 
appellate waiver 
  Certain double-jeopardy and prosecutorial vindictiveness 
claims (if waiver is specific) 
  Statutory exceptions to Tollet (if waiver is specific)  
  Errors by the court with respect to sentencing (CA (if waiver 
is specific), NY, most federal courts), but not illegal 
sentences 
Not waived by plea or 
appellate waiver, but may 
be waived by habeas 
waiver 
  Claims for which exhaustion is excused 
Cannot be waived    Jurisdiction 
  Plea was not voluntary and knowing 
  Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the plea 
  Specific rights in specific states, e.g., speedy trial or 
defendant’s competency to stand trial in NY. 
  Sentencing error (MN); illegal sentences (CA, NY, most 
federal courts) 
 
Table 1.  Claims waived by plea, appellate waivers, and habeas waivers. 
30 See, e.g., Craig, 985 F.2d at 178; Boglin, 840 So.2d at 936. 
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quirement for state and federal habeas relief, respectively.
31  There-
fore, an appellate waiver effectively bars state or federal PCR relief 
on most claims that survive a plea because it prevents exhaustion of 
claims on direct appeal.  The only claims that may succeed are those 
that are excused from exhaustion.  See Table 1. 
C.  Prevalence 
Judging by my selection of examples of waivers in Section I.A, 
one might get guess that habeas waivers are mainly found in federal 
plea agreements.  This would be correct.  Although habeas waivers 
are employed in approximately half of the states I surveyed,
32 they 
are not used with any serious frequency in these states.  States where 
habeas waivers are employed include Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Carolina, 
and Washington.  States that never appear to use habeas waivers in-
clude Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Wisconsin.   
Habeas waivers are more common in federal pleas, but there is 
significant heterogeneity across federal districts in the rate with 
which these waivers are employed.  One-quarter of districts never 
employ habeas waivers.
33  This group includes, for example, the 
Western District of Missouri, the District of Columbia District, and 
the Northern District of Florida.  Of the districts that employ habeas 
waivers, one-half use them in all plea bargains.
34  This group includes 
the Districts of Arizona and Hawaii.  The remaining federal districts 
that employ habeas waivers do so on a case-by-case basis.   
Moreover, those federal jurisdictions that use waivers with fre-
quency appear to have done so only starting in the last five or ten 
years.  The earliest example I could find of a habeas waiver was from 
1984 in California.
35  This waiver appears to be an outlier, judging 
from the rare acknowledgment of such waivers by courts.  California 
and North Carolina use waivers more frequently in the early 1990s,
36  
although dramatic growth in usage of habeas waivers did not occur 
                                                                                                                 
31 See, e.g., U.S. v. Pipitone, 67 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2nd Cir. 1995).  Indeed, on court has held that a 
plea agreement itself implies both an appellate and a habeas waiver, U.S. v. Viera, 931 F.Supp. 1224, 
1228 (M.D. Pa. 1996), and another that an appellate waiver in a plea agreement implies a habeas waiver, 
Bouseley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284, 288-89 (8th Cir. 1996).  For criticisms of these cases, see Sanford I 
Weisburst, Adjusting a Criminal Defendant’s Sentence After a Successful Collateral Attack, 64 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1067, 1075-1079 (1997). 
32 Habeas waivers were found in 10 of 19 states. 
33 Specifically, waivers were found in only 28 of 37 districts contacted.   
34 Fourteen of the 28 districts that use habeas waivers, use them in every plea agreement. 
35 In the Matter of Philip A. DeMassa, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 737 (1991).  
36 U.S. v. Henslee, 1996 WL 622789 (9th Cir.(Cal.)); U.S. v. Miller, 1995 WL 627710 (4th 
Cir.(N.C.)). 
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until the late 1990s.  A commonly cited trigger among federal prose-
cutors is a 1997 directive from the Department of Justice encouraging 
all assistant U.S. attorneys (AUSAs) to include appellate and habeas 
waivers in plea agreements.
37
The remainder of this subsection attempts to explain these pat-
terns in the usage of habeas waivers.  As a backdrop to this discus-
sion, it is important to understand the nature of the bargain struck in a 
habeas waiver.  The defendant gets her expected sentence given the 
probability of habeas litigation and outcomes in habeas litigation,
38 
plus an increment in her sentence to reflect the fact that a settlement 
permits the risk-averse defendant to avoid the risk of suffering an er-
ror in criminal procedure and the uncertainty of error-correcting ha-
beas litigation.  If the government is risk neutral or risk averse, the 
government should not oppose the elimination of the risks of error 
and error-correction by means of a settlement.  Since the government 
is akin to a monopoly seller of a risk-reduction technology,
39 if the 
defendant is risk averse, the government should be able extract from 
the defendant a sentence enhancement to reflect the amount the de-
fendant would be willing to pay to avoid these risks.  For the gov-
ernment, a settlement avoids the expected cost of defending against a 
habeas claim.  The transaction cost of a habeas waiver is the time re-
quired of defense counsel and the prosecutor to negotiate a trade of 
habeas rights.  Because there is a constitutional right to counsel in 
criminal cases, these costs are mainly borne by the government.  The 
incremental cost of a habeas waiver is rather small, however, because 
the parties are already negotiating a plea agreement. 
1.  Why are habeas waivers less common in state plea agreements? 
The first puzzle with regard to the prevalence of habeas waivers 
is why they are less common in state plea agreements than federal 
plea agreements.  Perhaps it is because the cost of habeas litigation – 
and therefore the value of a habeas waiver – is lower for state prose-
cutors.  One reason may be that state prisoners are less litigious than 
federal prisoners.  This is illustrated by Table 5 in Appendix B, which 
                                                                                                                 
37 David E. Carney, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the Federal 
Government, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1019, 1019 (1999). 
38 Interestingly, if habeas litigation is a statistically complete error-correction method, i.e., the aver-
age correction measured in reduction of sentence length is the same as the average error measured in in-
crease in sentence length, then the expected sentence should be the same with or without a habeas 
waiver.  If the defendant is risk neutral, this may be a useful test for the efficacy of habeas litigation.  
Were habeas litigation a poor error correction device, one should expect to see plea agreements with ha-
beas waivers have a lower sentence than plea agreements without such waivers. 
39 The government does not, by consenting to a settlement, sell insurance.  The reason is that a set-
tlement does not transfer the risk from the defendant to the government.  Rather, it eliminates the risk of 
litigation altogether. 
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suggests, for example, that in 1998 each state prisoner filed less than 
one federal habeas petition while each federal prisoner appears to 
have filed more than two such petitions.  State prisoners may be less 
litigious because federal habeas rights are less valuable to state pris-
oners than to federal prisoners.  This in turn may be due to the respect 
federal courts give to state appellate and post-conviction review court 
judgments.  Alternatively, it may be due to higher success rate that 
state prisoners have with PCR claims in state court than in federal 
court.  This is illustrated in Table 7 of Appendix B, which suggests 
that the rate at which state prisoner petitions are granted is as high as 
11 percent in state court, but no higher 2 percent in federal court.  Of 
course, the fact that state prisoners file fewer federal habeas petitions 
than federal prisoners does not mean they file fewer state habeas pe-
titions.  Therefore, there is insufficient evidentiary support for the 
proposition that state prisoners are less litigious overall than federal 
prisoners.   
Perhaps the cost of habeas litigation is lower for state prosecu-
tors because states have simpler sentencing systems than the federal 
sentencing guidelines so that there are fewer sentencing errors at the 
state level than at the federal level.  Moreover, the state systems may 
impose greater limits on the rights of defendants to challenge sen-
tencing errors than the federal guidelines.  There are a number of 
problems with these assertions.  To begin with, an increasing number 
of states, like the federal government, have complicated sentencing 
systems.
40  Indeed, one National Center for State Court study found 
that sentencing errors comprise a quarter of state direct appeals and 
that state appeals courts find error in a quarter of cases where sen-
tencing issues are raised.
41  Moreover, errors in sentencing guideline 
calculations by federal district courts are mainly addressed on direct 
appeal, not on habeas review.  To raise them in a habeas petition, the 
federal prisoner has to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial and 
appellate counsel to excuse her failure to raise the errors on direct 
appeal – rather substantial hurdles.  Because sentencing errors are 
unlikely to explain habeas litigation by federal prisoners, differences 
in sentencing regimes are unlikely to explain differences in habeas 
litigation rate by federal versus state prisoners. 
Even if the costs of habeas litigation are no lower at the state 
level than the federal level, perhaps federal prosecutors are more 
likely to insist on a habeas waiver because they are more likely to in-
                                                                                                                 
40 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code, §§ 1168-1170.6 (West 1985); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, ¶¶ 1005-8-1 to 
1005-8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1981); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 (Burns 1991); N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 70.00(2)-(3), 70.02, 70.06, 220.00-43 (McKinney 1987); Ala. Code § 13-A-5-6 (2003); GA. Code 
Ann. § 17-10-1 (2002); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 9-3-10 (2004).). 
41 NCSC, Understanding Reversible Error, at 8. 
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ternalize the cost of habeas litigation than state prosecutors.  At the 
federal level, the prosecutor who secures the conviction of a prisoner 
is responsible for defending the government against any habeas 
claims filed by that prisoner.  The same may not be the case at the 
state level.  For example, in New York, the state district attorneys’ of-
fices have special appellate counsel who only handles habeas ap-
peals.
42  The same is true of the U.S. Attorney’s office in the District 
of Columbia, which also handles “state” crimes in that jurisdiction.  
Even in states where the prosecutor who secures a conviction is re-
sponsible for related habeas claims, turnover may make it less likely 
that the prosecutor who secures the conviction is around to defend 
against derivative federal habeas claims.  (The costs of state habeas 
litigation are substantially addressed by appellate waivers, which are 
more common.)  The time that elapses between conviction and filing 
of a federal habeas claim is much longer for a state prisoner than a 
federal prisoner because the former must exhaust state remedies.  If 
states prosecutors’ offices have a turnover rate that is roughly equal 
to the rate in federal prosecutors’ offices, then a state prosecutor is 
less likely to bear the cost of defending against a federal habeas claim 
related to one of her convictions than a federal prosecutor is.
43  This 
is the most promising explanation, along perhaps with the higher rate 
of habeas litigation by federal prisoners, for the difference in state 
and federal usage of habeas waivers in plea agreements. 
2.  Why is there heterogeneity in the frequency of habeas waivers in 
pleas across federal jurisdictions? 
The second puzzle with regard to the prevalence of habeas waiv-
ers is why there is heterogeneity in the rates at which these waivers 
are employed in different federal jurisdictions.  To be clear, the mys-
tery is not only why some Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) offices 
never request habeas waivers, but also why some AUSA offices re-
quest habeas waivers in all plea agreements.  Surely there are cases 
where the parties cannot agree on a price for the waiver or where the 
sentence negotiated in the plea expires before the defendant could 
possibly file a habeas agreement.
44  I have no satisfying explanation 
                                                                                                                 
42 Telephone interview with Michael Green, District Attorney, Monroe County, New York (Dec. 9, 
2003).  
43 If the state has a higher turnover rate, this would also be true for a state habeas claims related to a 
state conviction.  But I do not have the data to support such a claim and it is likely that appellate waivers 
substantially address the cost of state habeas litigation to the state. 
44 At first blush it is also a mystery why plea agreements with appellate waivers also include habeas 
waivers given cases which hold that appellate waivers do not excuse waiver for federal prisoners.  But 
the mystery vanishes when one realizes that these cases do not span all federal jurisdictions and there 
are other excuses available even in the presence of appellate waivers, such as, for the purpose of bring 
an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, that trial counsel would have been appellate counsel as 
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for this observation.  Some assistant federal defenders have suggested 
that certain prosecutors will accept no plea agreements that do not 
contain a habeas waiver.
45  This bargaining position is hardly credible 
unless the prosecutors clearly value habeas waivers a great deal.  In 
that case, defendants should be able to obtain a very good price for 
the waiver, a fact which none of the federal public defenders inter-
viewed concede.   
Why do some AUSA’s never request habeas waivers?  A few as-
sistant federal defenders I interviewed suggested that certain prosecu-
tors simply do not think it fair to extract habeas right from defen-
dants.
46  This behavior is hard to reconcile, however, with the will-
ingness of the same prosecutors to extract trial and appellate rights 
from defendants.  Perhaps these prosecutors believe that habeas 
rights are “special.”  But there is reason to be skeptical given that 
prosecutors are repeat players who know the limited value of habeas 
rights and cost of habeas litigation – but more on that in Section I.D.   
An alternative explanation for the variation in use of habeas 
waivers is that there may be some AUSA offices that suffer higher 
turnover than others.  Offices with lower turnover have greater incen-
tive to include habeas waivers in plea agreements because prosecu-
tors in these offices will more likely bear the cost of habeas litigation 
related to any given plea agreement.  While this explanation has the 
advantage that it can be verified, I do not have the data to validate it.  
This leaves me without any satisfactory explanation for the heteroge-
neity in the usage of habeas waivers across federal districts. 
3.  Why are habeas waivers in federal pleas only a recent 
phenomenon? 
The last empirical puzzle with respect to habeas waivers is why 
federal plea agreements began to include habeas waivers with fre-
quency only in the last decade or so.  There are two possible reasons.  
The first is the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines in 1987, 
which may explain why habeas waivers were rarely used prior to the 
1990s.  Before the federal sentencing guidelines, judges had a great 
deal of discretion with regard to determination of sentences and this 
discretion could not be challenged unless the sentence lay above the 
maximum prescribed in the statute defining the substantive criminal 
offense.  The guidelines changed all that.  Judicial discretion is now 
substantially constrained by a series of calculations that depend, 
                                                                                                                 
well.  
45 Telephone interview with Mark Hosken, Public Defender, W.D.N.Y. (Dec. 5, 2003). 
46 Telephone interview with Alexander Bunin, Public Defender, N.D.N.Y. and D. Vt. (Dec. 5, 
2003). 
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among other things, on the seriousness of the offense, the criminal 
history of the defendant, and the assistance rendered by the defendant 
to the prosecutor.  These calculations can be quite complicated, and 
certainly generate a lot of errors.
47  Moreover, the guidelines provide 
a mechanism for defendants to challenge these errors.  Although the 
intended forum for these challenges is the direct appeal, a good num-
ber of these claims likely find their way into habeas claims piggy-
backed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
48   
A second explanation for the recent popularity of habeas waivers 
is the boom in habeas filings by federal prisoners since the mid-
1990s.  This is demonstrated by the solid line in Figure 2, which plots 
the relevant habeas filing data from Table 5 in Appendix B for the pe-
riod 1980-2000.  The cause of this boom in habeas litigation is uncer-
tain.  It could be anticipation of Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA).
49  Certainly AEDPA dramatically increased fil-
ings in April 1997 when its one-year statute of limitations on extant 
claims expired.  A Bureau of Justice Statistics study, though, has sug-
gested that the level of filings probably would have been lower, 
though grown at the same rate, even after 1997 in the absence of 
AEDPA.
50  In any case, the growth rate of filings does appear to have 
increased since the mid-1990s, whatever the distortion introduced by 
AEDPA.  This caseload has increased the resources required to han-
dle habeas litigation in AUSA offices, but sufficient additional re-
sources have not been made available to these offices.  The shortfall 
is illustrated by the dotted line in Figure 2, which also plots the num-
ber of attorneys working in AUSA offices from 1989-2000.
51  The 
additional workload per attorney increased the return to a waiver of 
habeas rights in a plea agreement.   
                                                                                                                 
47 See David E. Carney, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the Fed-
eral Government, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1019, 1020-21 (1999).  
48 Telephone interview with Gary Weinberger, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Con-
necticut (Dec. 3, 2003).   
49 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.). 
50 John Scalia, Prisoner Petitions Filed in U.S. District Courts, 2000, with Trends 1980-2000 (Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics Special Report) 6 (Jan. 2002). 
51 These data are drawn from Ann L. Pastore and Kathleen Maguire, eds., Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics 2001 (Bureau of Justice Statistics) 61 (Table 1.57) (2002); U.S. Department of Justice, 
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal 
Year 1998, at 2-3, and Fiscal Year 2000, at 2-3. 





















Figure 2.  Habeas filings by federal prisoners and number of federal prose-
cutors, by year. 
A number of federal prosecutors and public defenders I have in-
terviewed suggested that a 1995 directive from the Department of 
Justice
52 may have triggered a jump in the use of both appellate and 
habeas waivers.  Of course, this explanation only begs the question 
why the directive was issued.  Given the timing of the directive and 
the fact that data on habeas filings are readily available to the De-
partment of Justice, it appears likely that the directive was a response 
to the growth in habeas litigation by federal prisoners.  Even if this 
growth did not cause the directive, the directive provides a plausible 
– if not intellectually appealing – explanation for the growth in use of 
habeas waivers since the mid-1990s.   
D.  Habeas waivers have little value 
Whatever the explanations for the variation in use of waivers, it 
is also quite natural to wonder why habeas waivers would ever be in-
cluded in plea bargains at either the state or federal level.  The poten-
tial for habeas relief is of little benefit to prisoners who plead guilty.  
The only significant procedural risks these defendants face and can 
waive with a habeas waiver are sentencing errors.
53  But such errors 
                                                                                                                 
52 U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum to All U.S. Attorneys from John C. Keeney, Acting As-
sistant Attorney General at 3 (Oct. 4, 1995). 
53 Courts do not permit prisoners to waive their ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  See Sec-
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are generally resolved on appeal, not on habeas.  The trivial value of 
habeas rights to defendants who plead guilty suggests that the direct 
value of that right in trade, i.e., in terms of a shorter sentence, is also 
small.   
Nor do those rights have “nuisance” value.  From the prosecu-
tor’s perspective, the expected cost of habeas litigation by defendants 
who plead guilty is also very low.  Appendix B suggests that most 
prisoners do not file a habeas petition because they are released from 
prison before their habeas petitions are adjudicated.  Therefore, ha-
beas relief rarely offers an actual reduction in sentence.  This is espe-
cially true for prisoners who plead guilty because their plea typically 
affords them a shorter sentence than average for their crime.  Not 
surprisingly, a small percentage of federal habeas petitions are filed 
by prisoners who were convicted following a guilty plea.  Appendix 
B also demonstrates that the probability of success conditional on 
having pleaded guilty is very close to – if not exactly – zero.  This is 
consistent with the above claim that defendants who plead guilty re-
tain few procedural rights that can be vindicated on habeas review, 
These facts suggest that habeas waivers are low value transac-
tions.  It may be true that they are relatively cheap to insert in plea 
agreements.  Although courts require that habeas waivers are volun-
tary and knowing, defendants already have access to counsel for the 
guilty plea.  Because the value of habeas waivers are low, prosecutors 
need only offer a negligible sentence reduction, if any, to induce a 
waiver.  The fact that waivers are of low cost, however, does not war-
rant legal reforms to encourage waivers.  Let the system run its 
course.  If waivers proliferate, so be it.  They offer no serious, under-
valued benefit that needs encouragement from legislatures or courts. 
II.  HABEAS SETTLEMENTS 
This brings us to habeas settlements, the central topic of the pa-
per.  Once a prisoner files a post-conviction review (PCR) or habeas 
petition (terms I use interchangeably), she or the government’s attor-
ney may settle her claims outside of court in the same way a plaintiff 
and defendant might settle any civil suit.  The resulting habeas 
agreement would involve an exchange of the prisoner’s habeas 
claims for a reduction in sentence.  This section provides examples of 
such settlements and discusses whether they are subsequently en-
forceable in court.  More importantly, it attempts to explain why so 
few habeas petitions are resolved in this manner.  This is surprising 
because all prisoners were once defendants in criminal cases and 
                                                                                                                 
tion I.B. 
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most criminal cases are settled via plea agreements.  It is also surpris-
ing because habeas settlements have a great deal of value to all par-
ties involved – though that discussion is deferred until Section III and 
the conclusion. 
A.  Examples 
Although it may be obvious, note that, whereas federal prisoners 
may only file federal habeas petitions, state prisoners may file both 
state and federal habeas petitions.  This fact suggests the sorting of 
habeas settlements into three categories: (1) those involving state 
prisoners, a state government defendant, and a state PCR petition; (2) 
those involving state prisoners and state government but a federal ha-
beas petition; and (3) those involving federal prisoners, the federal 
government, and a federal habeas petition.  I have been able to find 
examples in the wild, so to speak, of settlements from the first and 
last category, but none involving state actors and a federal petition. 
For a typical example of a settlement involving a state PCR peti-
tion, consider the case of Clinton Flud.
54  Flud was convicted in an 
Arkansas trial court of rape and sexual solicitation of a child and was 
sentenced to 10 years for the first charge and six on the second, to be 
served concurrently.   After his direct appeal failed, Flud brought a 
state PCR motion.  His claim had sufficient merit that he was ap-
pointed counsel, who subsequently negotiated a deal with the state 
prosecutor whereby a first-degree sexual abuse conviction would be 
substituted for the rape charge.  The benefit to Flud was not only that 
the sexual abuse charge carried a sentence that was one year shorter, 
but also that he avoided an Arkansas rule that a prisoner must serve 
70 percent of his sentence if convicted of rape before he may be pa-
roled.
55   
For examples of habeas settlements involving federal prisoners, 
consider the habeas compromises that came on the heels of Bailey v. 
United States.
56  If an individual possesses a firearm during commis-
sion of a violent or drug crime, her sentence can be enhanced two 
levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  Before Bailey, he could also be con-
victed for “use” of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §924(c).  Because a § 
2D1.1 enhancement was not available if an individual was also con-
victed under § 924(c) and because a § 924(c) conviction carried a 
longer sentence – five years to be served consecutively – than § 
2D1.1, federal prosecutors almost always sought a § 924(c) convic-
                                                                                                                 
54 Flud v. State, No. CR-99-240 (Ark. 11th 2002). 
55 Telephone interview with Craig Lambert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Arkansas 
(Dec. 5, 2003). 
56 516 U.S. 137. 
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tion rather than a § 2D1.1 enhancement.  In Bailey, the Supreme 
Court ended this practice when it held that a conviction under § 
924(c) requires active employment of a firearm.  Mere possession is 
insufficient.
57  There were two groups of § 924(c) convicts who were 
benefited.  The first had clearly not actively employed a firearm and 
therefore would certainly prevail on a § 2255 motion.  The only risk 
they faced concerned their remedy: would they simply have five 
years knocked off their sentences or could the district court re-
sentence them using the § 2D1.1 enhancement, in which case their 
sentences would be reduced by less than five years?  For convicts in 
the second group, the facts of their cases suggested that they did not 
actively employ a firearm, but that conclusion was less than certain.  
These convicts therefore faced a second risk: they might not even 
win their §2255 claims.  Unfortunately for convicts in the first group, 
the federal sentencing guidelines eliminated any scope for a negoti-
ated settlement with prosecutors.  Once prosecutors seek a § 2D1.1 
enhancement, courts must increase the defendant’s offense level by 
two levels.  They do not have discretion to raise the offense level by 
only one level.  Therefore, the law gave prosecutors a choice only be-
tween seeking no enhancement or a two-level enhancement, which is 
identical to a choice between total capitulation and total success.   
There was no room to bargain.   In contrast, the law did permit con-
victs in the second group to settle their habeas claims with prosecu-
tors.  Because there was a risk that these convicts would lose their § 
2255 claims and receive no sentence reductions, they were willing to 
plead to a § 2D1.1 enhancement if the prosecutors would concede the 
convicts’ habeas claims.  Many prosecutors took this deal because it 
gave them a certain two-level sentence enhancement and avoided the 
risk of losing both a § 2255 claim and a request to re-sentence the de-
fendant with the § 2D1.1 enhancement. 
Most habeas settlements, whether at the state or federal level, 
appear to be oral agreements.  They are neither on the record or re-
duced to a written contract.  I have found only two exceptions.  The 
first is Clinton Flud’s case, which was presented orally, but on the re-
cord, at a hearing before the Arkansas trial court to which Flud’s PCR 
motion was assigned.  To protect himself, Flud requested a copy of 
the transcript from that hearing.  The second exception is post-Bailey 
habeas settlements from the Northern District of California.  An ex-
ample is the case of prisoner David Eliot Everett, who filed a Motion 
to Vacate and Sentence citing Bailey.  Before the district court ruled 
on the motion the parties settled and requested that the court treat the 
prisoner’s motion as one for relief under § 2255, grant such relief and 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. at 142-143. 
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vacate the § 924(c) conviction, and accept a plea agreement whereby 
the prisoner accepts a § 2D1.1 enhancement.  Both the court tran-
script from Flud’s case and the agreement from Everett’s case can be 
found in Appendix A. 
Habeas settlements are implemented in one of two ways.  More 
typical are cases like Flud’s and Everret’s.  In each a prosecutor con-
ceded the prisoner’s PCR claim on the condition that he sign a plea 
agreement with a sentence that was lower than his present sentence 
but not as low as he would have received had he won his PCR claim.  
An alternative approach is to request the court with jurisdiction over 
the prisoner’s sentence to amend his sentence to reflect, e.g., the fact 
that he provided assistance to prosecutors.  An example of this ap-
proach is the case of Susan Smith.
58  Charged with killing her hus-
band, Smith was convicted by an Arkansas jury of second-degree 
murder and sentenced to 20 years in prison.  After losing her direct 
appeal she filed a state habeas petition claiming that her counsel was 
ineffective because he failed to both raise a colorable battered-
woman syndrome defense and object that the prosecutor violated 
Griffin v. California by commenting on Smith’s invocation of her 
right to remain silent during closing arguments.  Her claim was suffi-
ciently credible that, before any court had an opportunity to evaluate 
her claims, Smith’s PCR counsel and the prosecutor negotiated an 
oral settlement whereby Smith would drop her PCR motion in return 
for the prosecutor filing a motion requesting that the court amend 
Smith’s conviction to manslaughter and sentence to 8 years.
59  
The circumstances in which habeas settlements may be found 
are quite varied.  They involve sentences less than life, life sentences 
(as will be illustrated by examples below), and capital sentences.
60 
They also occur at different times during the criminal process, though 
by definition always after sentencing.
61  The earliest example I have 
found involved a federal prisoner in the District of Columbia.
62  The 
prisoner had plead guilty but at sentencing the defense counsel failed 
to alert the court to a fact that would have affected it’s sentencing 
guideline calculation and lowered the prisoner’s sentence.  Unfortu-
nately, because the issue was factbound, appellate counsel could not 
raise it on appeal.  The prisoner could, however, raise it in a § 2255 
                                                                                                                 
58 The prisoner’s true name has been altered at the request of her PCR counsel, who is concerned 
about the legal validity of her habeas settlement. 
59 Interview with Craig Lambert, supra note 55. 
60 See Johnston, 739 N.E.2d at 123 n. 2 for examples of habeas agreements in capital cases.   
61 See id. at 123 nn. 1 and 2, for examples of agreements reached just before the trial court and the 
appellate court, respectively, ruled on a state PCR motion. 
62 The public defender for this prisoner requested that neither the prisoner nor the defender’s name 
be revealed. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press24 1/1/2005  Draft 
motion as part of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.   
Nevertheless, before filing the prisoner’s direct appeal, appellate 
counsel proposed and the federal prosecutor accepted an oral deal in 
which the prisoner would drop other admittedly weak claims on ap-
peal and the prosecutor would not contest the prisoner’s § 2255 claim 
of ineffective assistance and permit the prisoner to be re-sentenced.  
All the recommendations from the original plea remained in place; 
the only change was the sentencing guideline calculation. 
Like habeas waivers in plea agreements, habeas settlements are 
typically exchanges of habeas claims for sentence reductions.  Occa-
sionally, however, the terms differ.  In at least two cases, I have found 
proposed habeas agreements involving exchanges of not just habeas 
claims for sentence reductions, but also a defense in subsequent civil 
suits by the prisoner.  Both cases are from the same state in the Third 
Circuit.
63  In each the prisoner had been convicted in the 1970s of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to life.  After unsuccessful state 
PCR claims, the prisoner filed federal habeas claims.
64  In the first 
case, the prisoner asserted that there was insufficient evidence that he 
was the shooter and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to ob-
ject, e.g., to the prosecutors comments to the jury regarding the pris-
oner’s invocation of his right to silence.  In the second, the prisoner 
asserted that government witnesses intentionally altered documents 
and testified falsely as to his guilt.  In both cases the prisoner won in 
the district court and the state offered a settlement.  The state’s moti-
vation was not simply to avoid losing the habeas claims, but to avoid 
liability for monetary damages were the prisoner to file a subsequent 
civil suit asserting, e.g., malicious prosecution.  The settlement offer 
in each case was that the state would concede the habeas claims if the 
prisoner would plead to second-degree murder with a maximum 20-
year sentence.  The state’s hope was that the plea agreement would 
prevent the defendant from asserting he was innocent and thus make 
it difficult to assert that the state was malicious.
65  In both cases the 
prisoner’s counsel recommended that he take the deal but the pris-
oner did not.  In the first case, the prisoner lost on appeal to the Third 
Circuit and continues to serve his life sentence.  In the second the 
prisoner prevailed and is now suing the state in a civil action.   
                                                                                                                 
63 The names of the prisoners and the state are withheld at the request of an attorney who was in-
volved in both cases and informed me of the agreement in both cases. 
64 Technically in the second case the prisoner filed an unexhausted federal habeas claim, which he 
dropped to pursue his claim in a state PCR motion.  Exhaustion was not required, but the prisoner’s 
counsel said that there were some advantages to pursuing an actual innocence claim in state court. 
65 Although a guilty plea does not bar a subsequent civil action for damages under § 1983, see Har-
ing v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 323 (1983), where the Supreme Court has enforced an agreement in which 
the prisoner dropped a valid §1983 suit in return for dismissal of certain charges.  See Newton v. 
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392-98 (1987).  
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B.  Legal status 
Only one court has directly ruled on the validity of habeas set-
tlements involving state habeas claims.  In Indiana, a prisoner sen-
tenced in 1964 to two consecutive life terms for the murder of two 
children agreed to drop his PCR motion in 1985; in return the state 
agreed to modify his sentence to two consecutive 40-year terms, with 
credit for time served.  The victims’ parents did not learn of this 
agreement until much later and in 1997 filed a motion with the trial 
court that heard the PCR motion and approved the habeas agreement 
to intervene and to vacate that agreement.  The trial court rejected the 
motion to intervene.  The court of appeals upheld this decision but 
found that the trial court lacked the power to amend the sentence be-
cause the state murder statute in 1964 did not authorize 40-year sen-
tences for murder.  In Johnston v. Dobeski,
66 the Supreme Court of 
Indiana reversed this last ruling.  It initially took judicial notice of the 
fact that Indiana prosecutors and prisoners do reach habeas settle-
ments
67 and explicitly affirmed this practice and the power of PCR 
courts to accept habeas settlements.
68  It then found that the trial court 
did have the legal authority to impose the revised sentence because, 
e.g., the prisoner could already have been paroled under the sentenc-
ing rules in effect in 1964.
69   
There is a temptation to suggest this case implies that habeas set-
tlements involving state PCR claims surely stand on solid ground be-
cause the judgment above was issued in a jurisdiction that refuses to 
enforce either appellate or habeas waivers in plea agreements.  It is 
important to recognize, however, that such an inference rests on only 
one case.  If the tension between habeas waivers and habeas settle-
ments were brought to the attention of the Indiana Supreme Court, it 
is plausible that the Court would reverse not its opposition to habeas 
waivers but its support of habeas settlements.  Moreover, the tension 
can perhaps be reconciled by the fact that, in a plea the defendant 
waives the right to challenge errors that have yet to occur, while in a 
post-sentencing agreement the prisoner waives the right to challenge 
                                                                                                                 
66 739 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 2000). 
67 The court noted habeas agreements struck before the trial court ruled on a PCR motion, 739 
N.E.2d at 123 n. 1 (Ind. 2000) (citing State ex. rel. Woodford v. Marion Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 
64-65 (Ind. 1995) (prosecutor petitioned the court to set aside convict’s life sentence and impose a sen-
tence of 50 years with 10 years suspended to probation)), as well as those struck just before appeal, 739 
N.E.2d at 123, n.2 (citing McCollum v. State, No. 45S00-9403-PD-228, CCS entry 4/29/99, at p.6; and 
Townsend v. State, No. 45S00-9403-PD-227, CCS entry 4/29/99, at p. 7 (convicts on death row resen-
tenced to two consecutive 60-year sentences)).   
68 739 N.E.2d at 123.  There was a dissent in this case, but it did not dispute the validity of habeas 
settlements so long as their terms were legal.  See id. at 126 (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 125-126.   
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an error that has already occurred.  The collateral review right is 
much harder to value in the former case than in the latter.
70   
I have found no federal cases where a court has taken judicial 
notice of habeas settlement, let alone a case where a federal court has 
explicitly stated that such agreements are enforceable.  In Williams v. 
Duckworth, however, a Seventh Circuit panel including Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, the current Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit, ac-
knowledged the existence of a habeas settlement where the prisoner 
exchanged his state PCR claims for a modification of his Indiana 
conviction from a class A felony to a class B felony.
71  The prisoner 
later filed a federal habeas petition asserting that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to convict him of the class A felony in the first place.  
The district court dismissed this petition as moot and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed in light of the prior habeas agreement.
72  Moreover, 
in United States v. Everett,
73 the district court issued an order granting 
a federal prisoner habeas relief under § 2255 and re-sentencing him 
to shorter term of years based on “the parties’ stipulation.”   This 
stipulation was an agreement whereby the prisoner agreed to drop his 
motion to vacate his sentence and to consent to a sentence enhance-
ment for possession of a firearm during a drug transaction pursuant to 
U.S. Sentencing Guideline §2D1.1(b)(1).  In return, the AUSA agreed 
to concede to a § 2255 motion based on Bailey v. United States,
74 
which held that a prisoner could not be sentenced to a consecutive 
five-year term under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for mere possession of a 
firearm during a drug transaction.
75  I describe the logic behind this 
deal in further detail below.  
C.  Prevalence 
Although it is not possible to provide a systematic survey of the 
prevalence of habeas settlements, I have found – through interviews 
with state and federal public defenders and state prosecutors – nu-
merous examples of agreements involving state prisoners and state 
habeas claims or federal prisoners and federal habeas claims.  As 
noted earlier, I have found no settlements involving state prisoners 
and federal habeas claims.
76  Overall, my survey of state and federal 
                                                                                                                 
70 Moreover, habeas waivers technically require the prisoner to surrender his PCR rights, while ha-
beas settlements may be implemented in such a manner that the government concedes a PCR claim in 
return for a guilty plea to a lesser offence.  This was not the case in Johnston 739 N.E. 2d 121. 
71 738 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1984). 
72 Id. at 833. 
73 129 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1997). 
74 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
75 129 F.3d at 1225. 
76 Later in the text there will be an example of settlement offer that was rejected by the prisoner.  
Moreover, Michael Tanaka, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Central District of California (Dec. 5, 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art3  Habeas Settlements  27 
practice with regard to habeas settlements suggests that they can be 
found in one-third of states and three-fifths of federal districts.
77  The 
states include Arkansas, Colorado, Pennsylvania and Washington; the 
federal districts include many western states – Alaska, Colorado, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, as well as 
Minnesota, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the District of Co-
lumbia, the Northern District of Florida and the Eastern District of 
Texas.   
My only impression regarding the difference between habeas 
settlements involving state prisoners and those involving federal 
prisoners is that the former agreements are more evenly distributed 
across time.  Habeas settlements involving federal prisoners tend to 
be bunched in the periods immediately following U.S. Supreme 
Court cases announcing significant reinterpretations of substantive 
criminal laws or new criminal procedural rights.  Examples of such 
decisions include McNally v. United States,
78 Bailey v. United States,
79 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
80 and Ring v. Arizona.
81  If such a ruling is 
retroactive under Teague v. Lane,
82 it triggers a surge in federal ha-
beas filings that continues until the stock of convicts affected by the 
ruling have either filed a habeas claim or been released because their 
sentences have been served.  Even if such a ruling is not retroactive, 
it can trigger a surge of filings until a federal court in the relevant ju-
risdiction declares the ruling not to be retroactive.  Such a surge 
                                                                                                                 
2003), provided an example in which a federal magistrate judge requested that the parties settle a habeas 
claim.  That case involved a mentally disabled prisoner was given a life sentence for a $25 theft under 
California’s three-strikes law.  Tanaka filed a federal habeas petition with a claim he said was reasonable 
on the merits and strong on the equities.  At a hearing in open court, the magistrate judge requested the 
parties to go off-the-record.  He said he was strongly inclined to grant the writ but was not sure he could 
provide grounds that would be sustained on appeal.  He pleaded with the state to compromise.  The state 
district attorney, although personally inclined to do so, refused on the grounds that it was the policy of 
state attorney general not to compromise on habeas claims. 
77 More precisely, they were found in four of 13 states surveyed and 16 of 27 federal districts sur-
veyed. 
78 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (holding that federal mail fraud statute is limited to schemes targeting prop-
erty right).  The decision was effectively overruled in 2000 by 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
79 516 U.S. 137 (1995).   
80 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
81 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
82 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  Teague held that, with two exceptions, “new constitutional rules of crimi-
nal procedure will not be applicable to cases which have become final before the new rules are an-
nounced.”  Id. at 310.  New rules are those which “break[] new ground or impose[] a new obligation on 
the States … [or were] not dictated by precedent.”  Id. at 301.  The first exception is for rules that place 
certain primary private conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe or that address a substantive 
guarantee accorded by the U.S. Constitution.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989).  The sec-
ond exception is for “watershed rules of criminal procedure that are necessary to the fundamental fair-
ness of the criminal proceeding” because they not only “improve accuracy, but also alter our understand-
ing of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”  Sawyer v. Smith, 497 
U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990) (internal quotes omitted). 
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overwhelms the resources available to U.S. Attorneys’ offices, en-
couraging them to settle cases they would otherwise litigate.
83  
Even in jurisdictions where they may be found, however, habeas 
settlements are rare.  Even though habeas settlements are widely dis-
tributed from a geographic perspective, they are a tiny fraction of all 
habeas cases.  Not only are the number of government or defense at-
torneys who have settled habeas claims a small fraction of all such at-
torneys, but those attorneys who have ever settled habeas claims have 
only settled a fraction of the habeas cases they have handled.  This is 
surprising because so many of these attorneys also handle criminal 
cases, which they settle with great frequency.  They readily admit to 
engaging in plea bargaining – perhaps even having signed habeas 
waivers – but rarely to have settled a habeas petition. 
This remainder of this section attempts to explain the aforemen-
tioned patterns in the prevalence of habeas settlements.  Specifically, 
it examines, first, why they are not more common at either the state 
or federal level and, second, why agreements concerning federal ha-
beas claims are bunched after certain significant Supreme Court 
cases.
84     
1.  Why do so few habeas cases settle? 
The first step in explaining the dearth of habeas settlements is to 
determine which cases are poor candidates for settlement, either be-
cause there is little room for negotiation or the costs of negotiation 
are greater than the benefits.  The second step is to consider cases 
where it makes sense for parties to settle but still they do not.     
   
                                                                                                                 
83 Telephone interview with David Porter, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eastern District of 
California (Dec. 5, 2003); interview with Daniel Scott, supra note 8. 
84 It should be noted throughout that the frequency of habeas settlements will very likely be less 
than that of habeas waivers.  Although the elements of the bargain are fundamentally the same in both 
agreements, one important difference is that there are far fewer candidates for habeas settlements than 
habeas waivers because few defendants who are convicted ultimately file for habeas relief.  At the very 
least, only those who have been incarcerated long enough to complete their direct appeal and exhaust 
any remaining state remedies are able to file. 
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Table 2.  Four basic groups of habeas cases, their suitability for habeas settle-
ment, and shares of cases in each group. 
 
Group 
Share of non-capital habeas cases involving  
(capital numbers are in parentheses):  Suitable for 
No. Description 
State prisoner  
in state court 
State prisoner  
in federal court 
Federal prisoner  
in federal court 




guilty or is about to 
be released, or peti-






7% (assume same) 
Total:  















Not in group 1 or 4 
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100)  Yes 
                                                                                                                 
85 Data on non-capital state prisoners is from Victor E. Flango, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal 
Courts (National Center for State Courts) 66-67 (table 19 gives petitions denied because of procedural 
default), 86 (table 22 gives share that pleaded guilty) (1994).  Data on capital state prisoners who 
pleaded guilty is from id. at 86 (table 22).  Data on capital petitioners denied relief due to procedural de-
fault are unavailable.  Therefore, I will assume that the procedural default rate for capital cases is the 
same as for non-capital cases so that I can provide estimates of the size of each group. 
86 .58 = [.78×(1-.06-.2)], .63 = [.78×(1-.06-.13)].  The .78 (= 1-.22) comes from id. at 64-65 and is 
the share of denied state petitioners that does not have representation on state habeas.  It should be noted 
that procedurally defaulted claims are less likely to have representation than other denied cases. 
87 .04 =.05×(1-.1-.08), .05 =.05×(1-.03-.07).  The .05 = (1-.95) comes from id. at 64-65 and is the 
share of all capital petitioners – not just those denied relief -- without representation on state habeas. 
88 .68 = [.94×(1-.01-.18)], .76 = [.94×(1-.1-.18)].  The ,94 = (1-.06) figure comes from id. at 64-65 
and is the share of denied state petitioners that does not have representation on federal habeas. 
89 .16 =.3×(1-.4-.06), .25 =.3×(1-.1-.06).  The .3 = (1-.7) figure comes from id. at 64-65 and is the 
share of all capital petitioners – not just those denied relief – without representation on federal habeas. 
90 .16 = [.22×(1-.06-.2)], .18 = [.22×(1-.06-.13)].  See note 86 for derivation of the .22 figure. 
91 .78 =.95×(1-.1-.08), .86 =.95×(1-.03-.07).  See note 87 for derivation of the .95 figure. 
92 .05 = [.06×(1-.01-.18)] = [.06×(1-.1-.18)].  See note 88 for derivation of the .06 figure. 
93 .38 =.7×(1-.4-.06), .59 =.7×(1-.1-.06).  See note 89  for derivation of the .7 figure. 
94 Shares in this row are based on the fraction of petitions ultimately granted.  It excludes petitions 
that succeeded below but were denied on appeal.  Therefore, the numbers are an underestimate of the 
size of this group. 
95 This figure is from id. at 86 (table 22) 
96 The 3% figure is from id. at 86 (table 22).  The 10% figure is from James S. Liebman et al., A 
Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at 6 (June 12, 2000), at 
http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/ (last visited August 4, 2004). 
97 This figure is from Flango, supra note 85 at 86 (table 22). 
98 The 10% figure is from id. at 86, table 22.  The 40% figure is from Liebman, supra note 96 at 4.  
Liebman finds that in 82% of capital cases reversed on direct appeal, state habeas or federal habeas, the 
defendant was not re-sentenced to death.  Id. at 5. 
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One group of habeas cases that are clearly not candidates for set-
tlement is those in which the prisoner pleaded guilty or is scheduled 
to be released very shortly after the petition is filed, and those that 
have an obvious procedural flaw, such as being time-barred.  This set 
of cases (which are labeled “group one” in Table 2) includes at least 
29-43 percent of all petitions filed by non-capital state prisoners.
101  
Each of these petitions has the common feature that one can predict 
with great accuracy at the time of filing that the petition will not at-
tract the vote of a single state or federal judge or magistrate.  This 
group includes only cases that are poor candidates for habeas settle-
ments because the petitioners’ habeas rights are of de minimis value.  
The only incentive prosecutors have to settle these cases is the cost of 
litigating the cases.  This cost is likely to be low because most of 
these cases will be rejected by the trial court before the government is 
even asked to file a reply.  More importantly, the marginal transaction 
cost of negotiating a settlement is likely to be quite high.  For a set-
tlement to stand up to subsequent scrutiny in court, like a plea 
agreement it probably has to be voluntary and knowing.  This in turn 
requires that the petitioner have counsel.  Because petitioner has no 
constitutional right to counsel on collateral review, this means the 
government would have to pay for the prisoner’s counsel if it decides 
to settle but probably not if it does not settle.  
There are two groups of cases that are good candidates for set-
tlement.  One includes those habeas petitions which garner the vote 
of at least one judge in the state or federal habeas review process.  
This set (which is labeled “group four” in Table 2) includes at least 
the seven percent of non-capital state prisoner petitions ultimately 
granted at the state or federal level.
102  It also includes 13-46 percent 
of capital state prisoner petitions.
103  Like group-one cases, the mem-
                                                                                                                 
99 This figure  is the share of § 2255 petitions granted during 1996-2001 according to the Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts, ICPSR data sets 8429 and 3415. 
100 This figure suffers from two errors.  First, it overestimates the grant rate on federal habeas be-
cause it includes convictions and sentences overturned on direct appeal.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports that 6 of 28 defendants sentenced to death in the federal system during 1973-2001 had their sen-
tences or conviction overturned.  It does not indicate whether this was on direct appeal or federal habeas 
review.  U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2001, at 15 (ap-
pendix table 3) (Dec. 2002, NCJ 197020).  Second, the figure underestimates the grant rate because the 
28 cases include ones where the federal habeas process has not run its course.  It is possible more peti-
tions by defendants sentenced to death during 1973-2001 – especially recent years -- will be granted. 
101 The overall rate of procedural default is the probability of default in state court plus the prob-
ability that a case reaches the federal court and is defaulted.  Therefore, assuming the probability of de-
fault at the federal level is independent of that probability on the state level, the numbers in the text are 
calculated from the figures in   as follows: .29 = .13 + ([1-.1] × .18, .43 = .20 + ([1-.03] × .24).  Table 2
102 .07 = .06 + [.94 × .01]. 
103 .13 = .03 + [.97 × .1] and .46 = .1 + [.9 × .4]. 
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bers of group four are easily identified prior to final adjudication, 
though perhaps not at the moment a petition is filed.  The reason they 
should settle is that they have significant expected value to petition-
ers, they are likely to cost the government significant resources to 
litigate, and, importantly, the transaction cost of settlement is lower in 
these cases because they are likely to require appointment of counsel 
whether or not the government settles.   
The second group that should settle meet three criteria: they are 
not obviously without merit (like group-one cases) and have not al-
ready come close to being granted (like group-four case), but the pe-
titioner has been appointed habeas counsel by a court.
104  State courts 
generally appoint counsel for a prisoner if her habeas claims are col-
orable.
 105   Federal courts do so as long as her petition is not “patently 
frivolous or false.”
106  The reason why cases with habeas counsel 
(which are labeled “group-three” cases in Table 2) should be resolved 
out of court is that the marginal cost of settlement is very low.  Al-
though it may not be easy to identify the probability that these peti-
tions will be granted and thus the appropriate price for these cases, 
these cases at least warrant a settlement offer that reflects the ex-
pected cost to the government of litigating the cases.  The fact that 
governments are willing to pay for habeas waivers in plea agreements 
even though habeas petitions by those who plead guilty have virtually 
zero probability of success buttresses this conclusion.  Data on state 
prisoners suggests that group three includes 20-22 percent of all non-
capital and over 83-92 percent of all capital state prisoner petitions.
107   
So why do parties to cases in groups three and four fail to settle?  
One public defender suggested that the cost of habeas litigation to the 
government is actually quite small even in these cases because most 
                                                                                                                 
104 The remaining cases – those which are not obvious losers, or close or actual winners, and which 
are not prosecuted with the assistance of habeas counsel – are probably not good candidates for settle-
ment.  The probability of success is probably neither high nor evident.  More importantly, the marginal 
cost of negotiation is high because the government would have to pay for the prisoner to hire counsel for 
settlement talks.     
105 See, e.g., in Illinois, 725 I.L.C.S. 5/122-4; People v. McNeal, 742 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ill. 2000).  
Note that they are not required to do so by U.S. Constitution.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1987). 
Other states require a higher standard, requiring that the claims be more substantial, though the 
court retains the discretion to appoint an attorney so long as the claims are not frivolous.  All states, 
however, appoint the prisoner counsel if a hearing is to be held on any of his claims.  See, e.g., in Mon-
tana, Mont. Code Ann. §46-21-201(2); in South Carolina, S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d); Vance Cowden, Indi-
gent Defense Services for Post-Conviction relief in South Carolina: Current Problems and Potential 
Remedies, 42 S.C. L. Rev. 417, 428-34 (1991). 
106 Habeas Rule 4.  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977). 
107 This is calculated assuming the probability of appointment of counsel on state habeas is inde-
pendent of the same probability on federal habeas.  For non-capital cases: .20 = .16 + [(1 - .16 - .06) × (1 
- .01 - .24) × .06] and .22 = .18 + [(1 - .18 - .06) × (1 - .01 - .18) × .06].  For capital cases: .83 = .78 + [(1 
- .78 - .1) × (1 - .4 - .06) × .7] and .92 = .86 + [(1 - .86 - .03) × (1 - .1 - .06) × .7].   
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government submissions to the court are “form filings,” requiring 
only that government attorneys fill in the prisoner’s name, her crime, 
and a few case-specific facts related to her claims.
108  The contention 
is hard to reconcile, however, with the fact that so many federal plea 
agreements contain habeas waivers despite the low probability that 
defendants who plead will file for habeas relief and the even lower 
probability that those who do file claims that are not identifiably 
without merit.
109  Finally, even if it is true that the cost of litigation is 
low in most cases, the cost is most certainly not low in cases where a 
prisoner’s petition is granted at some level of the court system or is 
denied but subject to a dissent, let alone cases where the petition is 
ultimately granted.   
Perhaps parties fail to settle because they cannot agree on the 
probability that the petition will ultimately be granted and thus on a 
price for the petitioner’s habeas rights.  This is particularly likely 
where a court uses the vehicle of a collateral review petition to an-
nounce a new criminal right.  It is unlikely, though, that such dis-
agreements are sufficiently widespread to explain the dearth of set-
tlements, particularly because the parties on both sides – the public 
defender for the prisoner and the government’s attorney – are repeat 
players.  Moreover, there are few collateral review cases that an-
nounce a new right.  Indeed, Teague v. Lane
110 bars such a result in 
federal cases.    Finally, how is it that the defendants and the govern-
ment nearly always agree on price in exchanges of trial rights for sen-
tence in plea agreements but cannot agree on price in exchanges of 
habeas rights for sentence in habeas settlements?  Over 90 percent of 
defendants plead guilty, most pursuant to a plea agreement, yet no-
where near this percent of ultimately successful habeas claims are the 
products of settlement.     
A third explanation is that the majority of prisoners who file ha-
beas petitions, i.e., the majority of prisoners eligible for habeas set-
tlements, were not convicted following a guilty plea.  Perhaps their 
failure to plead demonstrates that they are less cooperative or that 
they assess probabilities of winning a case differently than govern-
ment attorneys.  There are three problems with this logic.  First, al-
though the individuals who plead guilty are often different than those 
who file habeas petitions, both groups are represented by the same 
defense counsel, typically state or federal public defenders, public in-
terest organizations, or private criminal defense attorneys.  It is 
unlikely that prisoners ignore their counsel’s advice on settlement 
                                                                                                                 
108 Interview with Ahilan Arulanantham, supra note 8. 
109 Interview with Gary Weinberger, supra note 48. 
110 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
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with much frequency and it is unlikely that defense attorneys are able 
to compromise for plea agreements but not for habeas agreements.  
Second, at least one state district attorney’s office reports that they 
frequently get calls from defendants seeking to bargain their habeas 
claims for sentence reductions.
111  Although none of the calls appears 
to have resulted in a habeas settlement, they do suggest that recalci-
trant – or principled, depending on your point of view – prisoners are 
probably not to blame for the dearth of settlements.  Finally, and per-
haps most fundamentally, the fact that parties cannot agree on prob-
able outcomes of a criminal case in order to reach a plea bargain does 
not mean that they cannot agree on probable outcomes of a collateral 
challenge in order to reach a habeas settlement.   
A fourth explanation for the dearth of habeas settlements is that 
the federal sentencing guidelines make sentencing compromises dif-
ficult because they reduce the discretion of courts over sentencing 
and permit only a narrow and rigid range of sentences for a crime.  
Even if parties agree on a revised sentence in return for the prisoner 
dropping her habeas petition, it is difficult to implement that com-
promise unless the compromise falls in the guidelines range or the 
parties can find a crime for which the petitioner can be convicted and 
offers a sentence equal to the compromise reached by the parties.  
This is a non-trivial task as demonstrated by the example in Section 
II.A of §924(c) cases following Bailey.  Although this explanation is 
the most promising so far, it does have two weaknesses.  It does not 
work for most state defendants, who are unlikely to be subject to sen-
tencing guidelines and who constitute all state habeas petitions and 
one-third of federal habeas petitions.  Moreover, some federal public 
defenders suggest that government attorneys may be open to com-
promises where the prisoner pleads to a lesser included offense of the 
crime for which the prisoner is currently serving time.  This com-
bined with the prosecutor’s adroit use of a recommendation of a 
downward departure for substantial assistance to the prosecution
112 
should make feasible a larger number of compromises.   
The final – though probably important – explanation for low 
prevalence of habeas settlements is that few state courts and no fed-
eral courts have the power to amend a sentence after sentencing.   
Therefore, to implement a habeas settlement, the government attor-
ney must concede a prisoner’s habeas claim in return for the prisoner 
agreeing to plead guilty to another crime.  (Recall the Flud and Ever-
ret cases from Section II.A.)  The difficulty with this strategy is that 
                                                                                                                 
111 Telephone interview with Wendy Lehmann, Head of Appellate Division, Monroe County Dis-
trict Attorney’s Office, New York (Dec. 9, 2003).   
112 Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 35. 
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conceding a habeas claims requires the government attorney – often 
the prosecutor on the initial charge – to either admit error by police or 
by himself.  The former concession may jeopardize cooperation be-
tween police and prosecutors, which is too high a cost for a settle-
ment.  The latter concession may be blocked by pride, often a very 
power human emotion.
113  This concern has been expressed in inter-
views by more than one prosecutor and may underlie other govern-
ment attorneys’ claims that they do not negotiate habeas settlements 
because no prisoners have any valid habeas claims.
114   
2.  Why is their bunching in settlements of § 2255 cases? 
The second puzzle concerning habeas settlements is why they 
are more uniformly distributed over time at the state level than at the 
federal level.  Recall that most federal agreements come on the heels 
of Supreme Court opinions that significantly reinterpret federal 
criminal laws or announce important new criminal procedural rights.  
One explanation is that although state prisoners are more successful 
in state court than in federal court, they are more successful in federal 
court than federal prisoners are.  The reason may be that federal 
courts commit fewer errors in criminal cases than state courts, at least 
those with respect to errors that are not caught by courts of appeal.  
Under this view, the only significant errors that federal courts make 
are those that are the subject of the landmark Supreme Court opin-
ions above.  The flaw with this story, other than the fact that habeas 
grant rates are poor indicators of error rates at trial and sentencing,
115 
is that there are still a number of federal prisoner petitions that suc-
ceed on claims unrelated to those landmark rulings.  It is reasonable 
to ask why the vast majority of these are not settled. 
Ultimately my investigation reveals that a significant number of 
cases that should be settled are not settled.  The fact that habeas 
waivers can frequently be found in federal pleas and that habeas set-
tlements are struck in a wide array if not a large quantity of habeas 
cases suggests that, in many cases where habeas settlement is possi-
                                                                                                                 
113 Another possible explanation for the dearth of habeas settlements is that the compromise sen-
tence that the parties litigating a habeas petition would negotiate to is often less than the time already 
served by the prisoner.  Therefore, the only chance the government has to keep the prisoner incarcerated 
in these cases is to defeat the habeas petition in court.  This explanation fails because the premise is un-
tenable.  From the government’s perspective, the worst case scenario from litigation is that the prisoner 
is set free, i.e., serves zero additional days.  If the government has a non-zero probability of prevailing 
against the prisoner’s habeas petition, the lowest the government will settle for is a positive additional 
sentence.  In other words, the compromise sentence would always be greater than the time served.  In-
terview with Gary Weinberger, supra note 48.   
114 Interview with Lehmann, supra note 111. 
115 For example, it could be that federal direct appeals are better at catching errors than state direct 
appeals.  See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 96. 
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ble but missing, defense attorneys and prosecutors simply failed to 
imagine that habeas claims could be settled for a sentence reduction 
or other such benefit to the prisoner.  Interviews confirm this.  Nu-
merous defenders have suggested to me that parties often do not 
think to negotiate an out-of-court resolution of habeas claims.  In 
fact, many defenders and prosecutors found the idea of settling ha-
beas claims quite novel – and potentially useful.
116  This suggests that 
there is considerable scope for settling habeas claims that are cur-
rently fully litigated in the current system.   
III.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section of the paper, I turn from arms-length analysis of 
patterns in the use of habeas settlements to a policy embrace of these 
settlements.  This is a three step process. First, I argue that habeas 
settlements are no less constitutional, and thus enforceable, than 
pleas bargains, appellate waivers and habeas waivers.  Second, I 
demonstrate that, in contrast to habeas waivers, habeas settlements 
can significantly benefit both prisoners and government attorneys.   
Finally, in order to maximize the value from habeas settlements, I 
urge legislatures to actively promote the resolution of habeas claims 
without fill full litigation and to remove certain legal impediments to 
the implementation of habeas settlements.  In addition, I ask courts to 
screen settlements to ensure that they protect the interests of prison-
ers.   
A.  Prisoners have a right to settle their habeas claims and habeas 
settlements are constitutional 
To eliminate any confusion about exactly what I am claiming, 
the reader should note that I take as given the proposition that plea 
bargains, if properly policed, are both constitutional and normatively 
desirable from a public policy perspective.  This issue has been thor-
oughly debated in numerous venues and I have nothing unique to 
contribute to that discussion.
117  I also take as given the constitution-
ality of appellate waivers and habeas waivers.  Although appellate 
waivers and habeas waivers – again properly policed – have not been 
as widely debated as plea bargains, the vast majority of courts that 
                                                                                                                 
116 Interview with Alexander Bunin, supra note 46; telephone interview with Madelein Cohen, 
Public Defender, D. Colo. and D. Wyo. (Dec. 3, 2003); telephone interview with Michael Tanaka, Public 
Defender, C.D. Cal. (Dec. 9, 2003). 
117 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969 (1992); Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and the Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004); 
Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1992); William J. 
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761 (1989). 
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have considered their constitutionality have found them unobjection-
able.
118  I am comfortable with these assumptions in part because I 
agree with them and in part because I do not think it likely that an 
additional argument against these waivers is likely to change courts’ 
opinions of their validity. 
From this caveat I proceed, first, to make what should be a non-
controversial claim: that prisoners have the right to settle their habeas 
claims.  Individuals certainly have the right to settle civil suits and 
habeas petitions are merely a species of civil actions.  In particular, 
individuals have the right to settle suits concerning the conditions of 
their imprisonment, i.e., § 1983 and Bivens actions alleging viola-
tions of their civil rights in prison.
119  These actions are certainly 
closely related, in an aesthetic sense if not strictly legal one, to ha-
beas claims.  Individuals also have the right to settle criminal cases, 
which may not be governed by the same procedural rules as habeas 
actions, but are from a formal legal perspective very closely related.  
Habeas actions are challenges to the procedure followed in prosecut-
ing a criminal case.  It is true that habeas settlements may potentially 
waive a larger set of errors in the criminal process than plea bargains.  
The latter waive all but a small set of pre-trial rights.  Habeas settle-
ments, however, can theoretically waive any error, even if unwaiv-
able in a plea bargain – such as ineffective assistance of counsel relat-
ing to a plea agreement – or error that post-dates a plea.  Indeed, a 
habeas settlement can involve rights that cannot be the subject of ei-
ther appellate waivers or habeas waivers.  But there is an important 
feature of habeas settlements that makes them “safer” than plea bar-
gains, appellate waivers, and habeas waivers.  Namely, habeas set-
tlements occur after an error in the criminal process has occurred 
whereas plea bargains and the other waivers may occur before such 
error is detected.  The additional information available to prisoners 
makes settlements less likely to corrupt the fairness or accuracy of 
the trial process.   
My second claim is that habeas settlements do not offend the 
constitution.  In order to be more precise with this statement, one 
must identify the provisions that settlements might violate.  The most 
likely candidate is the due process clause.
120  The legal theory might 
be that habeas settlements undermine the sanctity of the criminal 
process.
121  Habeas litigation is necessary to ensure that process was 
                                                                                                                 
118 See Section I.B.  
119 See, e.g., Young v. Quinlan, 950 F.2d 351 (3d Cir 1992). 
120 U.S. Const. Amend. V, IV § 1. 
121 A separate theory is that such settlements undermine the sanctity of the habeas litigation proc-
ess.  But that process is not its own master.  Rather it serves to clean up after the criminal process.  Even 
if one were concerned with the habeas litigation process, it unclear why habeas settlements undermine 
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and continues to be without prejudicial error.  Settlement, by itself, 
does not hinder this result.  Such a settlement may include a reduc-
tion in sentence that accounts for the likely result if the habeas litiga-
tion ran its course.  Moreover, settlement does not diminish the deter-
rence effect of habeas litigation – if there were some – any more than 
settlement of medical malpractice suits undermine the deterrence ef-
fect of medical malpractice law.  Perhaps the argument could be 
made that habeas settlements allow the state to “bribe” defendants for 
cutting corners in the criminal process.  But that is exactly what plea 
bargains do as well.  Habeas settlements are not qualitatively differ-
ent from plea bargains on this dimension.  Moreover, one must ask 
what the purpose of the criminal process is.  Does it have value other 
than to protect the freedom of defendants?  If not, then settlements 
serve the purpose of the criminal process – if not the process itself – 
because they expedite the release of a prisoner who suffered error at 
the hands of the criminal process. 
A second constitutional provision that habeas settlements may 
violate is the equal protection clause.  The theory would be akin to 
that which renders the trade of voting rights unconstitutional.  Indi-
viduals who are poor might feel greater pressure to trade their voting 
rights – to feed themselves or pay for medical care – than those who 
are rich.  Therefore, rich people may be in a better position to exer-
cise their voting rights.
122  The flaw in the analogy between voting 
rights and habeas rights is that the Constitution demands – or has 
been interpreted to demand – that every individual have equal capac-
ity to exercise their voting rights.
123  There is no such demand with 
respect to habeas rights.  True, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, indi-
cates that Congress shall not “suspend” the “Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus,” but that is a prohibition on complete denial, not 
regulation.  Indeed, the Court has sanctioned – implicitly if not ex-
plicitly – rather severe regulations of that right in AEDPA.
124  This 
statute treats state prisoners differently than federal ones and capital 
prisoners different than non-capital prisoners.
125  Another distinction 
                                                                                                                 
the habeas process any more than settlements of contract disputes undermine the process by which 
courts police contracts violations.   
122 See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
123 See U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-315 (date); Harper, 383 U.S.  at 667-668. 
124 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) 
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.). 
125 Not inconsistent with this view is the claim that, while there is only one Equal Protection 
Clause, it is arguable that restrictions on voting rights are treated to more exacting scrutiny than restric-
tions on other rights.  Justices Black and Harlan suggested as much in their respective dissents in 
Harper:  in their view the Court was not applying the standard rational basis test but relying on the fact 
that electoral processes – and by extension voting rights – are “‘precious’ and ‘fundamental.’”  Harper, 
383 U.S. 683 (Harlan dissenting); id. at 673-677 (Black dissenting). 
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between trading voting rights and settling habeas claims is that voting 
rights are exchanged for money, while a habeas settlement involves 
the exchange of a habeas claim for a shorter sentence.  Thus, a habeas 
settlement is closer to exercise of the habeas right than a sale of one’s 
vote is to exercise of that vote.  Moreover, whatever variation there is 
in the effect habeas settlements have on different prisoners, that 
variation is a function not of the underlying features of those prison-
ers, but the differential value of those prisoners’ rights.  It may be a 
violation of the equal protection clause to treat differently two indi-
viduals who are equal under the law, but prisoners who receive dif-
ferent settlements are not equal under the law.  A prisoner with a bet-
ter claim will receive a better deal than someone with a weaker 
claim.  Finally, if habeas settlements violate the equal protection 
clause, surely plea bargains and appellate and habeas waivers do as 
well, which would violate the basic assumption of my analysis. 
B.  Habeas settlements promote public policy 
The next step I take is to demonstrate that habeas settlement is 
desirable from a policy perspective.  Assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that legal obstacles to habeas settlements are removed and that 
parties to habeas litigation actively pursue settlement.  The resulting 
habeas agreements would promote the welfare of prisoners by guar-
anteeing them a reduction in sentence proportional to that which the 
latter might expect from vindication of their collateral review rights.  
The best illustration of how valuable such a guarantee might be is the 
two cases from the Third Circuit, recounted in Section II.A, of pris-
oners serving life sentences for first-degree murder.  After filing ha-
beas petitions, both were offered similar settlements which would re-
duce their sentences to 20 years.  Although counsel for each prisoner 
advised them to accept the deal, both refused.  One of the prisoners 
won, was released and is now seeking civil damages. The other, how-
ever, lost and remains behind bars.  It is true that some prisoners 
would prefer to take such a gamble, but surely there are others – per-
haps a majority – would rather take 20 years for sure rather than risk 
a lifetime in jail.   
Settlement would also save government attorneys the time and 
expense of habeas litigation.  These cost-reductions are significant 
because the cases I identify as reasonable candidates for settlement 
are also the most expensive cases to litigate.  All of these cases are 
ones where the prisoner has been appointed habeas counsel, who is 
typically paid by the government.  The appointment of habeas coun-
sel also raises costs because claims made by counsel are harder to de-
fend, holding quality of the claims constant, and because appoint-
ment of counsel indicates that the claims in a petition are of higher 
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quality.  In those cases where the petition wins the vote of at least one 
judge along the way to final adjudication, the costs can be particu-
larly large because litigation can be drawn out.  Each of these argu-
ments about costs is particularly compelling in the case of prisoners 
serving capital sentences.  Estimates suggest the cost of state and 
federal habeas review is between $3.5 and $4.5 million per death row 
inmate.
126   
The policy objections to habeas settlements fall in two classes: 
those targeted towards internalities and those targeted towards exter-
nalities of these deals.  By internalities I mean concerns about 
whether a deal promotes the interest of the parties to the deal.  This in 
turn can be broken down into two separate inquiries.  Are the parties 
no worse off than if they had not struck a deal?  If they are no worse 
off, how are the rents of the deal allocated among the defen-
dant/prisoner and the government?  I believe the concern that moti-
vates the first inquiry can be addressed by policy reforms which re-
quire courts to police habeas settlements to ensure that the exchange 
is knowing and voluntary.  This in turn demands, among other things, 
that the prisoner received the advice of habeas counsel.
127  While one 
might be concerned about the quality of this counsel, no one suggests 
that habeas counsel, when appointed, perform worse than trial coun-
sel.  To the extent that the criminal justice system promotes plea bar-
gains, it should therefore be willing to promote habeas bargains.
128   
The concern underlying the second inquiry – the distribution of 
gains from trade – is difficult to brush aside.  Habeas bargains are be-
tween a monopolist (the government) and a competitive entity (the 
prisoner).  The prisoner who seeks insurance against the risk of ha-
beas litigation must purchase that insurance from the government.  
However, the government, when it seeks relief from the expense of 
litigation, can turn to any of a large number of prisoners.  This imbal-
ance implies that any rents to a habeas bargain will accrue to the gov-
ernment.  By itself this complaint does not require that courts invali-
date habeas settlements.  So long as they are voluntary, prisoners will 
not be left worse off by habeas settlements.  Ordinarily, the concern 
with monopoly pricing is that it precludes consumers who are willing 
to pay more than marginal cost from purchasing a product.  But this 
                                                                                                                 
126 C. Linder, Cost of Death: A Billion Dollars and Counting, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 29, 1993, at 
1.  See also D. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, A Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1015, 1016 (1993). 
127 See Section III.C. 
128 In any case, if further reassurance is required, courts may be encouraged to vet the substance of 
settlements to ensure they are “fair.”  This would be similar to logic behind why courts apply greater 
scrutiny to duty of loyalty violations than to duty of care violations in corporate law.  The reason for the 
difference in treatment is that with duty of loyalty violations the board of directors of the corporation 
has a conflict of interest that impedes her ability adequately to representation corporate shareholder. 
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deadweight loss is something that should not trouble people who are 
concerned about habeas settlements because it simply means there 
will be fewer habeas settlements.  Moreover, the government is more 
like a discriminating monopolist than an ordinary monopolist.  Where 
it sees that a party cannot “afford” the price – here a smaller reduc-
tion in sentence – it demands for insurance against habeas litigation 
risk, it can lower the price of that insurance.  The reason is that it has 
a good deal of information on the criminal history, medical condition, 
and age of the prisoners with which it negotiates.  Finally, habeas set-
tlements are qualitatively no worse on this score than plea bargains, 
which extract all rents from defendants when they want to avoid a 
trial.  
Habeas settlements may have important externalities.  Cases 
which are settled have no opportunity to establish new rules of crimi-
nal procedure, which in turn are necessary to ensure that the criminal 
justice system treats defendants fairly.  Moreover, it could be argued 
that courts must publicly punish the government for procedural errors 
lest the government not be deterred from ignoring or even manipulat-
ing the criminal process to the disadvantage of defendants.  Finally, 
public policing of criminal procedure by the courts is necessary to 
prevent erosion of public confidence in and therefore support for the 
criminal justice system.   
Although these claims sound plausible, they do not stand up to 
scrutiny.  To begin with, habeas settlements do not meaningfully hin-
der the creation of new procedural rights.  First, Teague v. Lane bars 
the creation of such rights in federal habeas litigation.  Such litigation 
can only resolve questions about rights to habeas review.  Second, the 
option to settle does not bar litigation.  Just as many prisoners who 
are subsequently found to be guilty elect not to plead guilty but go to 
trial, many prisoners with meritorious habeas claims will not settle 
but litigate.  These prisoners will provide courts many opportunities 
to establish new habeas law.  (Recall that nearly a third as many ha-
beas cases (21,345) were filed by federal prisoners in 2000 as crimi-
nal cases (62,152) were filed against defendants in federal district 
court that year.
129)  Third, legally meaningful cases are unlikely to set-
tle.  These are cases where habeas law is not clear and therefore par-
ties are more likely to disagree about what the court will do.  And e-
ven if legally significant cases are settled, what is the purpose of ha-
beas law if not to correct errors in the criminal process that improp-
erly extend a prisoner’s sentence?  If habeas settlements can achieve 
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Pastore and Maguire, supra note 51, at 402 (table 5.9).   
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the same end without changing the law, are they still objectionable on 
the grounds that they do not facilitate changes in habeas law?   
Concerns that settlements erode deterrence of procedural errors 
are similarly overblown.  First, there little evidence that suggests 
government officials are more likely to implement legal reforms if 
they lose a court judgment than if they settle a complaint.  Although, 
the absence of such data may be a product of the secrecy which typi-
cally surrounds settlements, there are other problems with the deter-
rence objection.  If judgments deter errors in the criminal process, 
one would expect that rates at which petitions are filed and are 
granted would decline over time.  There is no evidence of such a 
trend.
130  Moreover, because courts cannot announce new rules of 
criminal procedure in habeas cases after Teague, deterrence depends 
on the frequency with which courts grant habeas petitions.  Since the 
number of settlements will exceed the number of cases where courts 
grant habeas petitions, however,  settlements may actual promote de-
terrence. 
Finally, there is no empirical data which suggests that confidence 
in the criminal justice system is a function of how robust habeas law 
is.  To the contrary, any observer paying even a modicum of attention 
to academic discussions of AEDPA would conclude that the system is 
broken in the absence of habeas settlements.
131  If anything, people 
pay attention to criminal justice results not the process that generates 
those results.  If habeas settlements lead to reductions in sentences in 
cases where the criminal process was perverted, they will have the 
same effect on public confidence as judgments.  Would it have made 
any difference to public perception regarding insider trading law that 
Martha Stewart was convicted by a jury rather than pleaded guilty?  
It is likely that most people do not even know that Ms. Stewart was 
not even indicted for violating insider trading laws but for obstruction 
of justice.
132   
C.  Recommended policy reforms 
In light of the gains to trade from habeas settlements, the federal 
government and the states should act to promote habeas settlements.  
This first requires that training programs for government attorneys 
and public defenders at both levels begin including practicums on 
bargaining over habeas rights.  These may be modeled after those on 
                                                                                                                 
130 See   in Appendix B.  Table 5
131  See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional 
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. Chi. 
Legal F 315 (1998); James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?  AEDPA and Error Detection in 
Capital Cases, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 411 (2001). 
132 USA v. Stewart, et al 1:03 CR 717, (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press42 1/1/2005  Draft 
plea bargaining.  In addition, to overcome the inertia of tradition, 
judges presiding over habeas proceedings should continuously en-
courage parties to resolve their differences out of court.  This is not 
unheard of: one federal public defender from California recounted 
how a magistrate judge strongly urged parties to a habeas case in-
volving a three-strike sentence to settle their dispute without his in-
tervention.
133  Although the state’s attorney ultimately balked, other 
government attorneys will likely pay heed to judges, who are the ul-
timate arbiters of their defenses.   
Exhortation alone, however, is insufficient to maximize the 
value of negotiation.  The sentencing guidelines, at both the federal 
and state levels, may rule out certain sentencing compromises.  This 
is unlikely to change after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Blakely v. Washington.
134   Blakely is a clarification of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey,
135 which holds that any fact that increases a defendants 
sentence beyond the “statutory maximum” for her crime must be 
submitted to the jury.
136  Blakely holds that relevant maximum is not 
the  absolute maximum mentioned in the relevant statute but the 
maximum authorized given the facts submitted to the jury.
137  Al-
though the Supreme Court has agreed to hear challenges to the sen-
tencing guidelines based on Blakely,
138 it is unlikely to rule the sen-
tencing guidelines altogether unconstitutional.  First, that result is not 
required by Apprendi, which permits determinate sentencing condi-
tional on a given set of facts being submitted to a jury.  Second, strik-
ing down the sentencing guidelines would cause much havoc in the 
criminal justice system and the Supreme Court is not insensitive to 
the practical consequences of its rulings.
139
To overcome obstacles to settlement created by sentencing 
guidelines, Congress should amend Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 35 to permit courts, upon the government’s motion, to amend a 
prisoner’s sentence if she drops her habeas claims, regardless of 
whether the modified sentence was within the guideline range for the 
                                                                                                                 
133 Interview with Tanaka, supra note 116. 
134 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).  Interestingly, there may be another reason that Blakely increases habeas 
settlements.  Until courts determine whether Blakely is retroactive to cases beyond direct appeal but de-
cided after Apprendi, it may trigger a flood of habeas cases.  See id., at 2549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
Just as AUSA offices began to settle §924(c) cases when they were overloaded with habeas petitions 
based on Bailey, AUSA office may begin to settle habeas petitions based on Blakely – or its progeny. 
135 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
136 Id. at 490. 
137 Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537. 
138 See United States v. Booker, 2004 WL 1713654; United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1713655.   
139 Indeed, the most likely consequence of Blakely, which simply increases the cost of imposing 
any sentence, is an increase the extent of plea bargaining.  To the extent that it makes higher sentences 
more difficult to impose because a greater amount or quality of facts must be submitted to the jury, 
Blakely will tend to reduce the average sentence imposed on all defendants. 
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prisoner’s offense.  Currently, Rule 35 requires that the prisoner pro-
vide substantial assistance to prosecutors in another case before the 
court may reduce her sentence.  Moreover, any modification in her 
sentence must comport with the policy goals of the sentencing guide-
lines.  Possible language for these changes are is presented in Appen-
dix C.  Analogous changes should also be implemented by state legis-
latures in their codes of criminal procedure.
140     
The proposed reform will encourage habeas settlement not just 
by making more compromises legally feasible, but also by making 
them politically feasible at the district level.  Recall that, under exist-
ing rules, government attorneys typically have to concede a pris-
oner’s habeas petition on the condition that she plead to a lesser-
included crime.  The need to maintain good relations with police or 
simply pride prevents many prosecutors from making such a conces-
sion, and thus blocks many settlements.  Amending Rule 35 as sug-
gested, however, would permit modification of a prisoner’s sentence 
without admissions of error by government attorneys, eliminating 
this roadblock.   
Because the constitutional and public policy arguments above in 
favor of habeas bargaining depend on the knowing-and-voluntary na-
ture of resulting deals, legislatures and courts should take two pre-
cautions to ensure that habeas settlements are fair to defendants.   
First, state and federal legislatures should establish a more formal 
process for court review of habeas bargains.  Already Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure require that Rule 11 colloquies discuss any 
habeas waivers in federal plea agreements.
141  There is no formal pro-
cedure, however, at the federal or state level for Rule 11-type collo-
quies for habeas settlements with prisoners.  This is a concern be-
cause a significant percentage of the habeas settlements I have found 
are purely oral contracts.  If these are challenged, the outcome will be 
highly uncertain in the absence of a paper trail.  As a result, courts 
may ultimately choose not to enforce bargains, robbing prisoners of 
the benefits of their bargain with the government.  This can be 
avoided by amending Rule 35 to also require courts to screen habeas 
settlements along the lines that they screen plea bargains in Rule 11.  
Plausible language for such an amendment can also be found in Ap-
pendix C. 
Second, courts should permit prisoners to challenge the validity 
of their bargains on the grounds that the bargain was not voluntary or 
                                                                                                                 
140 Although this reform appears to displace the sentencing guidelines, it is a narrow exception that 
does undermine the purpose of those guidelines.  Those guidelines are intended to reduce arbitrary 
variation in sentencing.  Reductions in sentence due to success on habeas claims are not arbitrary, even 
if discounted by the probability of success. 
141 See F.R.Cri.Pro. 11(b)(1)(N).  This amendment was made in 2002. 
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knowing or that they received ineffective assistance of counsel with 
respect to the bargain.  Indeed, courts that have addressed the validity 
of habeas waivers in plea agreements have carved exactly such ex-
ceptions to their enforcement of such waivers.  These exceptions are 
unlikely lower value of habeas settlements to government attorneys 
so long as courts conduct proper Rule 11-type colloquies at the time a 
habeas bargain is struck.  Such colloquies would render meritless 
most ex post voluntary-and-knowing challenges to habeas bargains in 
the same way that Rule 11 screening of guilty pleas reduces the num-
ber of habeas filings (and the success rate of these filings).   
CONCLUSION 
My discussion of the policy merits of habeas settlements in Sec-
tion III.B focused on the welfare of the parties to the settlement.   
There are, however, two equally important beneficiaries that I failed 
to mention.  One is the court system.  I estimate that a policy of pro-
moting the settlement of post-conviction review motions could re-
duce habeas litigation by one-third.  I arrive at this number by esti-
mating the share of habeas petitions that are good candidates for set-
tlement, i.e., where the petitioner makes credible claims that warrant 
the appointment habeas counsel or where the petitioner one or more 
votes to grant during the course of litigation.  These two groups of 
petitions, which account for at least 28 percent of all non-capital 
cases and 96 percent of all capital cases, are natural candidates for 
settlement because the cost of litigation is sufficient high and the cost 
of negotiation is sufficiently low.
142  Importantly, because these two 
groups of cases are among more complicated and resource-intensive 
to litigate, mere case counts underestimate the full benefit to the 
courts, which may free up half the time they spend on habeas peti-
tions. 
The other – and perhaps more important – beneficiary may be 
prisoners not directly involved in settlements.  Post-conviction litiga-
tion has exploded in the last few decades.  For example, the number 
of federal habeas petitions filed by prisoners has tripled between 
1980 and 2000, when courts docketed nearly 30,000 cases.
143  Be-
cause settlement could reduce this load by one-third, it could lower 
the work load of federal district courts by around 10,000 cases.  Such 
relief would reduce the pressure courts and legislatures feel to adopt 
procedural rules to expedite the handling of habeas cases, rules which 
may lead to the rejection of petitions that are otherwise meritorious 
                                                                                                                 
142 True, not all these cases would ultimately settle.  But the fact that 90 – 95 percent of criminal 
cases settle suggests that a very high proportion of these habeas cases would also settle.   
143 See   in Appendix B.  Table 5
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simply because prisoners have failed to follow procedure.  A reduced 
caseload would also free up courts to spend time on habeas cases that 
do not settle, and the prisoners who bring them.  Significantly, these 
cases would probably include petitions involving novel habeas 
claims.  Such claims are poor candidates for settlement because par-
ties are less likely to agree on the probable outcome of the claims.  In 
this manner – and perhaps counter-intuitively, habeas settlement may 
actually improve the quality of habeas case law rather than replace it.   
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APPENDIX A: TEXT OF HABEAS SETTLEMENTS 
A.  Habeas settlement involving a state prisoner trading his state 
PCR rights 




CLINTON FLUD, PLAINTIFF 
VS. 
STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEFENDANT 
CASE NO. CR-99-240 
 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. 
MCCORKINDALE, II, CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE 1TH JUDI-




ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF 
Mr. Gordon Webb, Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 483 
Harrison, AR 72601 
 
ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT 
Mr. Craig Lambert 
Attorney at Law 
400 W. Capitol 
Suite 1700 
Little Rock, AR 72201 
 
THE COURT:  We can take up the – is there an agreement in 
Flud that you all need to read something into the record? 
… 
MR. WEBB:  Yes.  Your Honor, the case before the Court is 
Clinton Flud v. State of Arkansas, CR 99-240 and comes before the 
Court on a petition pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  Mr. Flud is represented here by Craig Lambert, 
who appears with him to day [sic], and Mr. Lambert and myself have 
entered into a discussion with regard to a proposed disposition of the 
                                                                                                                 
144 This transcript was certified on Oct. 26, 2002, by Linda Adams, Official Court Reporter for the 
Circuit Court of the 14
th Judicial District, Division 3, Arkansas, Supreme Court Certificate No. 528. The 
transcript was paid for by the plaintiff, Clinton Flud, well before this study was begun. 
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Rule 37 petition and we would like to present that to the Court at this 
time. 
MR. [sic] COURT:  State the agreement. 
MR. WEBB:  Your Honor, for the record, Mr. Flud was con-
victed at trial of the crime of rape and the crime of solicitation of a 
child.  He received a ten year sentence on the rape and a six year sen-
tence on solicitation of a child.  At this time, pursuant to our agree-
ment the State would, and the defense, would enter into a proposed 
agreement that the rape charge be amended to a lesser charge of sex-
ual abuse in the 1st degree.  I guess [sic] the rape conviction be va-
cated and the sexual abuse in the 1st degree be substituted for it with 
the recommendation that his sentence on the substituted charge be 
nine years as opposed to the original ten.  We don’t propose to disturb 
the solicitation of a child felony conviction and the six year sentence 
imposed there on [sic].  We’d recommend to the Court that the sen-
tence now imposed in the amended judgment be nine years and six 
years and those sentences to run concurrent and that the defendant be 
given credit for time served.  It is also proposed to the Court that at 
this point we recommend that the Court --- that the defendant not be 
required to complete the RSVP at this point in light of the fact that 
probably given the fact that he’s served over three years at this point, 
there’s probably very little benefit to be obtained from that program.  
That’s the proposed agreement. 
MR. LAMBERT:  Your Honor, to follow up on the final point 
that was made, we would ask that, and there’s a place in the amended 
judgment where the Court can put that in writing, that the RSVP pro-
gram not --- the Court recommends that his completion of the RSVP 
program be not made a condition of his parole because there is a 
lengthy waiting list for that and it’s also about a one year program. 
THE COURT:  Very well.  The Court will go ahead and adopt 
the agreement of the parties.  He’ll be adjudicated on the sexual 
abuse --- is that what it is? 
MR. WEBB:  Sexual abuse in the 1st degree, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  And then we’re not altering the other charge? 
MR. WEBB:  No, sir. 
THE COURT:  And he’ll be sentenced to a term of nine years on 
the sexual abuse charge. 
MR. WEBB:  The State will prepare a precedent [sic] reflecting 
this agreement, Your Honor, and this should dispose of the Rule 37 
petition. 
MR. LAMBERT:  I do want to make it clear that the amended 
judgment will so reflect so they want [sic] misconstrue it at the ADC 
that the rape conviction is vacated and the 1st degree sexual abuse is 
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substituted for that.  If there’s anyway [sic] they can misconstrue that, 
I think they would. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Anything else? 
MR. LAMBERT:  Thank you. 
 
B.  Habeas settlement involving a federal prisoner trading his federal 
habeas rights 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EAST-
ERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,  
v. 
DAVID ELIOT EVERETT, Defendant. 
 
NO. CR S-92-115  
 
STIPULATED REQUEST TO VACATE CONVICTION AND SEN-
TENCE, DISMISS INDICTMENT, AND  RESENTENCE; 
[LODGED]  ORDER     
 
Defendant, DAVID ELIOT EVERETT, by and through Daniel 
Broderick, Assistant Federal Defender, and David Porter, Research 
Attorney, and the United States of America, by and through Johnny 
L. Griffin, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, in order to resolve the above-
entitled matter without protracted litigation, hereby enter into the fol-
lowing stipulation, and request that the Court enter the proposed or-
der attached hereto. 
The parties hereby agree and stipulate to the following: 
1.  Defendant is hereby withdrawing in a separate pleading the 
Motion to Vacate Conviction and Sentence, filed on December 6, 
1996, and assigned CIV S-96-2120-DFL-GGH.  The parties join in 
petitioner’s  request that the court vacate its Notice and Order filed in 
that case on December 23, 1996, directing the parties to file respon-
sive pleadings.   
2.  In Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that conviction of a defendant for “use” of a fire-
arm under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) requires evidence sufficient to show an 
active employment of the firearm by the defendant.  116 S.Ct. at 505.  
The underlying conduct with respect to the firearms conviction in Mr. 
Everett’s case, however, is insufficient to show active employment of 
weapons by Mr. Everett. Under the authority of Bailey, the conviction 
and sentence on the §924(c) count must be vacated and the underly-
ing charge dismissed. 
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3.  There is evidence in the record that Mr. Everett possessed 
dangerous weapons in relation to his drug trafficking crimes.  Thus, 
under Sentencing Guideline §2D1.1, Mr. Everett’s base offense level 
for his conviction under Count One should be increased by two of-
fense levels. 
4.  The parties jointly request that the Court consider this plead-
ing to be the functional equivalent of a § 2255 motion and a state-
ment by the United States in response that it has no objection to the 
Court granting relief to the defendant in accordance with Bailey v. 
United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), and vacating his conviction and 
sentence under count five of the indictment in Case #CR. S-92-115-
DFL, for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
5. Pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
parties agree that Mr. Everett be resentenced on count one of the su-
perseding indictment as follows: 
  a. Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guideline §2D1.1(b)(1), Mr. 
Everett’s base offense level for conspiracy to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine should be enhanced by 2 
levels.   
  b. The Defendant’s Offense Level is Level 25, the Criminal 
History is Category II, with an imprisonment range of 63-78 months.  
The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United 
States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of Seventy-
Eight (78) months. 
6. Mr. Everett’s waiver of presence at resentencing is attached 
hereto. 
 
Accordingly, the government and Mr. Everett hereby request the 









DANIEL J. BRODERICK 
Assistant Federal Defender 
Attorney for Defendant 
DAVID ELIOT EVERETT 
 
Dated: January __, 1997     
CHARLES J. STEVENS 
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United States Attorney 
 
By: _________________________________ 
JOHNNY L. GRIFFIN, III 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
  
 
O R D E R 
 
After reviewing the parties’ stipulation and the file in this matter, 
and good cause appearing therefor [sic], the court hereby ORDERS 
that: 
1. The conviction and sentence of DAVID ELIOT EVERETT, 
Reg. No. 06051-097, for violation of Section 924(c) of Title 18, 
United States Code, is hereby VACATED and count five of the in-
dictment against defendant DAVID ELIOT EVERETT for violation 
of the same offense is hereby DISMISSED;  
2. Defendant, DAVID ELIOT EVERETT is hereby committed 
to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be impris-
oned for a term of SEVENTY-EIGHT (78) months on Count I of the 
indictment charging violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; 
3. The clerk shall forthwith prepare an amended judgment re-
flecting only the conviction on Count I of the superseding indictment  
and shall serve a copy of the amended judgment on the Warden at the 
United States Penitentiary Lompoc, 3901 Klein Boulevard, Lompoc, 
CA   93436; and 
4. The clerk shall also serve a copy of the amended judgment on 
the United States Bureau of Prisons and the United States Probation 
Office. 
 
Dated: January ____, 1997   
 
_____________________________ 
HONORABLE DAVID F. LEVI 
United States District Court 
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL APPENDIX ON HABEAS LITIGATION 
This section presents statistics on the demand for, prevalence of, 
and outcomes in habeas litigation.
145  These numbers suggest three 
conclusions relevant to habeas settlements.  First, most habeas litiga-
tion is generated by a small subset of the prison population that is in-
carcerated long enough to benefit from habeas relief.  Second, most 
convicts plead guilty but convicts who pleaded guilty are responsible 
for a small percentage of habeas petitions filed by prisoners.  Third, 
the probability of federal habeas relief is certainly small, but not as 
small as suggested in prior studies.  These studies generally ignore 
the fact that state prisoners have two bites at the PCR apple, once in 
state court and one in federal court.  The one exception to this con-
clusion concerns federal habeas petitions by convicts who pleaded 
guilty.  Their probability of success is basically zero. 
A.  Few convicts have sentences long enough to benefit from 
collateral review 
My empirical survey of habeas litigation begins with data on the 
number of individuals who possess state or federal PCR rights.  Table 
3 presents data from 1980-2000 on the number of individuals on pro-
bation, in jail, in prison and on parole.  In 1998, for example, the 
numbers in each category were roughly 3.7 million, 590 thousand, 
1.3 million and 715 thousand, respectively.  This is a rough estimate 
of the population eligible for collateral review.  Omitted are individu-
als who have completed their sentence, but are eligible to attack their 
conviction due to the collateral consequences on future convictions 
because of habitual offender sentencing rules.  Convicts are typically 
sentenced to probation or incarceration.  The population in jail in-
cludes individuals in custody awaiting trial and most convicts sen-
tenced to less than one year of incarceration.  Those on parole have 
been released from prison after some term of years, but remain under 
supervision of the government.  Their release is typically conditioned 
                                                                                                                 
145 The data are drawn a number of sources.  Data on outcomes in criminal cases and sentences 
come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Prisoner data come from the National Correctional Report-
ing Program and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Data on federal habeas filings come from the Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts.  Data on outcomes in federal habeas litigation come from a number of 
sources.  Pre-AEDPA data is primarily from studies sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the 
National Center for State Courts.  Post-AEDPA data come from a new data set assembled by Marc 
Falkoff, a Special Master assigned to handle a backlog of federal habeas petitions filed by state prison-
ers in the Eastern District of New York.  This data set includes roughly 500 cases since 1996 – nearly 
300 since 2002 – and this paper is the first to employ the data to validate some of the conclusions from 
pre-AEDPA studies of habeas litigation.  It should be acknowledged that often data are available for 
state prisoners or federal prisoners but not both or for federal habeas filings but not state habeas filings.  
I assume in these cases that state data are representative of federal data and vice versa. 
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on certain behavioral standards; if these are violated the parolee may 
be returned to prison for a portion of his remaining sentence.  With 
few exceptions, only incarcerated convicts file PCR motions.  Pre-
trial detainees will almost always obtain a trial before they will ob-
tain PCR relief.
146  For those on probation or release, the filing of a 
habeas claim takes up valuable time that is not otherwise spent in a 
prison cell.   
The criminal process takes time.  The median time for process-
ing convicts in federal courts in 2001 was 11.1 months for jury trials 
and 6 months for guilty pleas.
147  Median time for state courts in 1998 
was 379 days for jury trials and 216 days for guilty pleas.
148  This de-
lay serves to further reduce the population that has habeas rights 
valuable enough to exercise.  Table 4 provides data from 1980-2000 
                                                                                                                 
Year Probation Jail Prison Parole Total
1980 1,118,097 182,288 319,598 220,438 1,840,400
1981 1,225,934 195,085 360,029 225,539 2,006,600
1982 1,357,264 207,853 402,914 224,604 2,192,600
1983 1,582,947 221,815 423,898 246,440 2,475,100
1984 1,740,948 233,018 448,264 266,992 2,689,200
1985 1,968,712 254,986 487,593 300,203 3,011,500
1986 2,114,621 272,735 526,436 325,638 3,239,400
1987 2,247,158 294,092 562,814 355,505 3,459,600
1988 2,356,483 341,893 607,766 407,977 3,714,100
1989 2,522,125 393,303 683,367 456,803 4,055,600
1990 2,670,234 405,320 743,382 531,407 4,350,300
1991 2,728,472 424,129 792,535 590,442 4,535,600
1992 2,811,611 441,781 850,566 658,601 4,762,600
1993 2,903,061 455,500 909,381 676,100 4,944,000
1994 2,981,022 479,800 990,147 690,371 5,141,300
1995 3,077,861 507,044 1,078,542 679,421 5,342,900
1996 3,164,996 518,492 1,127,528 679,733 5,490,700
1997 3,296,513 567,079 1,176,564 694,787 5,734,900
1998 3,670,441 592,462 1,224,469 696,385 6,134,200
1999 3,779,922 605,943 1,287,172 714,457 6,349,800
2000 3,826,209 621,149 1,316,333 724,486 6,445,600
Table 3.  Population under jurisdiction of state or federal correctional 
systems. 
146 This is most certainly the case given federal and state speedy trial statutes.  N.Y. Crim. Proc. 
Law §30.30 (1996); Cal. Pen. Code § 686 (1972); 18 U.S.C.S. § 3161 (1988). 
147 Pastore and Maguire, supra note 51 at 442 (Table 5.41).   
148 Id. at 447 (Table 5.48).   
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on the number of prisoners with sentences longer than one year, bro-
ken down by those in the federal system and the state system.
149  In 
1998, for example, there were roughly 104 thousand inmates in fed-
eral prisons and 1.14 million inmates in state prisons serving sen-
tences longer than one year. The state and federal breakdown is rele-
vant insofar as state prisoners have both state and federal PCR rights, 
whereas federal prisoners have only federal PCR rights.  To some ex-
tent such a simplistic description overstates the bundle of rights that 
state prisoners possess relative to federal prisoners.  A state prisoner’s 
federal habeas rights are limited by procedural rules that require the 
prisoner to exhaust state PCR and that accord state judgments a cer-
tain respect in federal court.  That said, state prisoners likely have 
greater PCR rights than federal prisoners because federal rules ex-
cuse exhaustion if state remedies are inadequate or state judgments 
are not fully res judicata on federal courts.  
Table 4 also breaks down prison populations into the stock of in-
dividuals in prison each year and the annual flow of individuals into 
prison.  The stock is the sum of the flow in and the flow out.  The 
flow for state and federal prisons in 1998 was roughly 350 thousand 
and 34 thousand, respectively.  Although there was no statute of limi-
tations on federal habeas claims prior to AEDPA, there were strong 
rules that limited successive and fragmented petitions.
150  Such rules, 
along with the gradual decay of evidence with time, likely ensured a 
steady flow of prisoners with habeas claims into federal court over 
time that was proportional to the flow of convicts into prisons.
151  Of 
course the time required for direct appeal – one study suggests that 
this typically takes a year
152 – and the statute of limitations for state 
and federal PCR claims suggests that the current year’s admissions 
will not affect the number of state petitions filed by state prisoners 
                                                                                                                 
149 The figures for 1999-2000 are projections based on 1998 data and growth rates in the overall 
prison population in Table 3.  Importantly, these figures do not include convicts with life or capital sen-
tences, though these convicts are a very small fraction of the total. 
150 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1996); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules § 7003 (1963); Cal. Pen. Code § 1475 
(1967). 
151 That said, there was a dramatic spike in monthly habeas corpus filings exactly one year after 
AEDPA was enacted.  This spike is due to the one-year statute of limitations imposed retroactively on 
prisoners with claims more than one year old when AEDPA was enacted.  The clock on these claims 
started when AEDPA went into effect in April 1996 and expired on April 1997, subject to tolling for 
claims filed in state court in the interim.  Scalia, supra note 50 at 6; Fred Cheesman, Roger Hanson, 
Brian Ostrom, and Neal Kauder, Prisoner Litigation in Relation to Prisoner Population, 4(2) Caseload 
Highlights: Examining the Work of State Courts (National Center for State Courts) 3 (Sept. 1998).  This 
spike also shows the up in annual statistics in Table 4.  After 1997, however, the growth rate of habeas 
filings is similar to that in the mid-1990s prior to AEDPA.   
152  See, e.g., Daniel J. Foley, The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals: A Study and Analysis, 66 
Tenn. L. Rev. 427, 442-443 (1999).  This study found that criminal appeals in Tennessee, which has one 
of the faster state appellate court systems, took a little over 11 months on average during the period 1993 
- 1995. 
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and federal petitions filed by federal prisoners until at least one year 
into the future.  For state prisoners filing federal petitions the lag be-
tween admission and filing is extended further by the time required to 
exhaust state remedies.  Indeed, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 
habeas filings in 1992 found that the average amount of time that 
elapsed between the date a state prisoner was convicted and the date 
he filed a federal habeas petition was 1,802 days or nearly 5 years.
153  
Not only do direct appeals, statute of limitations and exhaustion 
delay filing of prisoner petitions, they also likely reduce the number 
                                                                                                                 
> 4 yr. > 5 yr.
Stock Flow Flow Flow
Year Fed. State Total Fed. State State State
1980 20.6 295.3 316.0 10.9 131.2
1981 22.2 331.5 353.7 11.1 149.2
1982 23.7 371.9 395.5 12.5 164.6
1983 26.3 393.0 419.3 14.1 173.3
1984 27.6 415.8 443.4 13.5 166.9 0.22 0.16
1985 32.7 447.9 480.6 15.4 183.1 0.22 0.15
1986 36.5 485.6 522.1 16.1 203.3 0.19 0.12
1987 39.5 521.3 560.8 16.3 225.6 0.19 0.12
1988 42.7 561.0 603.7 15.9 245.3 0.18 0.11
1989 47.2 633.7 680.9 18.4 297.8 0.16 0.08
1990 50.4 689.6 740.0 18.5 323.1 0.13 0.09
1991 56.7 732.9 789.6 20.2 317.2 0.14 0.09
1992 65.7 780.6 846.3 22.2 334.3 0.16 0.07
1993 74.4 857.7 932.1 23.7 318.1 0.16
1994 79.8 936.9 1,016.7 24.0 321.1
1995 83.7 1,001.4 1,085.0 24.0 337.5
1996 88.8 1,048.9 1,137.7 27.3 326.5
1997 95.0 1,099.3 1,194.3 30.6 334.5
1998 103.7 1,144.7 1,248.4 34.4 347.3
1999 109.0 1,203.3 1,312.3 36.1 365.1
2000 111.5 1,230.6 1,342.0 37.0 373.3
Sentence length > 1 year (thous.)
Incarceration length (%)
Table 4.  Stock and flow of incarcerated population, by sentence length and 
actual time of incarceration (excluding prisoners serving life or capital sen-
tences). 
153 Roger A. Hanson and Henry W.K. Daley, Federal Habeas Corpus Review: Challenging State 
Court Criminal Convictions (Bureau of Justice Statistics Discussion Paper NCJ-155504) 12 (Sept. 
1995).  This lag has been increasing over time.  A Department of Justice study from 1979 estimated that 
the time from conviction to filing was around 1.5 years.  Paul Robinson, An Empirical Study of Federal 
Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Judgments (U.S. Department of Justice) 4(a), (1979). 
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of petitions filed.  Prisoners may take into account the time required 
to obtain PCR relative to the length of their sentences when deciding 
whether to file for such relief.
154  If the time to relief is greater than 
one’s sentence, there is no value to filing for PCR.  Table 5 uses data 
from Table 4 on the share of state admissions that will remain in 
prison for four and five years before being released to calculate the 
number of state and federal inmates admitted into prisons from 1980-
2000 who will remain there long enough to make filing for PCR re-
lief worthwhile.
155  The four and five year data are chosen because it 
is assumed that a trial, direct appeal, delay before filing a PCR peti-
tion, disposition of a state petition, and disposition of a federal peti-
tion each take around one year.  While data on processing times for 
state PCR claims are generally unavailable, data on federal habeas 
petitions suggest that in 1995 these took on average 273.9 days to 
process.
156  My assumptions imply a delay of four years before relief 
for a state prisoner filing a state PCR motion and a federal prisoner 
filing a federal habeas petition.  For a state prisoner filing a federal 
habeas petition the delay is five years because of exhaustion require-
ments. 
Table 5 also presents annual data from 1980-2000 on the number 
of federal habeas petitions and petitions to vacate a sentence filed by 
state and federal prisoners.  In order to determine the prisoner popu-
lation from which petitions filed in a given year by state prisoners 
                                                                                                                 
154 This delay certainly affects the number of dispositions since a prisoner is likely to drop a peti-
tion once he is released.   
155 Data in Table 2 on the share of admissions incarcerated for more than four and five years are 
based on data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP).  Shares incarcerated for more 
than four years, for example, are calculated by taking the number of individuals released in years t+1 to 
t+4 who were admitted in year t, summing them and the subtotal from the total number of admissions in 
year t, and dividing by the total number of admissions in year t.  Note that incarceration length is not the 
same as sentence length since most prisoners are released before serving the full length of their assigned 
sentence.  Since data on releases by year of admission are only available for 1984 to 1998, data on 
shares are only available for 1984 – 1993 for greater-than-four year incarceration and 1984 – 1992 for 
greater-than-five year incarceration.  Due to data limitations, I have used estimates rather than actual 
numbers for:  admissions for the years 1980-1983; admissions with sentences greater than four years for 
the years 1994-2000; and admissions with sentences greater than five years for 1993-2000.  The figures 
in Table 3 on the number of admissions incarcerated more than four or five years are calculated by tak-
ing the shares from Table 2 and applying them to estimates of prison populations by the Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics (BJS).  The NCRP data only contain data on states that voluntarily report their prison 
populations on the NCRP questionnaire.  Many states do not.  This problem does not afflict the data 
gathered by the BJS.  This gap in the NCRP data means the admissions-by-incarceration-length numbers 
in Table 3 implicitly assume that states that report to the NCRP are representative of states that do not.  
The admissions-by-incarceration-length numbers in Table 3 that lie outside the range for which their 
analogous shares in Table 2 are available are based on projections assuming that the admission shares 
are constant at the 1984 rate before 1984 and at the 1992 or 1993 rates after those years.  I do not make 
linear projections because the actual data are not monotonic.  
Moreover, I have not yet obtained analogous federal data so the conditional federal inmate esti-
mates are based on state release statistics. 
156 John Scalia, Prisoner Petitions in the Federal Courts, 1980-1996, at 7 (Table 7) (BJS Oct. 1997). 
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were drawn, the relevant number is the population of state prisoners 
admitted four years earlier but who will not be released for at least 
five years.  Because federal prisoners do not have to exhaust state 
remedies, the relevant population of federal prisoners is that admitted 
three years earlier but who will not be released for at least four years.  
Moreover, the total number of habeas filings has to be adjusted 
downwards to account for the fact that the prisoner data in Table 4 
and Table 5 do not include convicts with life or capital sentences.  
The Bureau of Justice Statistics study of pre-AEDPA habeas filings 
mentioned earlier estimated that such convicts account for 21 and 
under one percent of habeas filings, respectively.
157  Under this logic, 
22 thousand of the state prisoners admitted in 1994 are responsible 
                                                                                                                 
Prison admissions
State Federal
Year 4 years 5 years 4 years 5 years prisoners prisoners
1980 28575 20513 2375 1705 7029 2735
1981 32488 23323 2414 1733 7786 2877
1982 35855 25740 2714 1948 8036 3113
1983 37737 27091 3075 2207 8523 3225
1984 36352 26096 2938 2109 8335 3332
1985 40244 26649 3377 2236 8520 4932
1986 39603 24568 3130 1941 9040 3235
1987 42339 27135 3051 1956 9524 3472
1988 45182 26806 2934 1741 9867 3938
1989 46619 23273 2878 1437 10545 4344
1990 41613 28023 2380 1603 10817 4937
1991 42851 29025 2734 1852 10325 5440
1992 53300 22780 3539 1513 11296 5490
1993 50275 21674 3739 1612 11574 6846
1994 50751 21879 3787 1632 11908 6069
1995 53345 22997 3789 1634 13627 7331
1996 51615 22252 4322 1863 14726 11432
1997 52876 22795 4830 2082 19956 13577
1998 54891 23664 5434 2342 18838 8608
1999 57702 24876 5712 2462 20493 9342







f  Table 5.  Prisoners with valuable federal habeas rights and quantity o
federal habeas filings, by jurisdiction and year. 
157 Hanson and Daley, supra note 153 at 11.  
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for roughly 15 thousand federal habeas filings by state prisoners in 
1998 and 3,800 of the federal prisoners admitted in 1995 are respon-
sible for the 6,700 federal habeas filings by federal prisoners in 
1998.
158
These statistics suggest that federal prisoners are far more liti-
gious than state prisoners.  In 1998, each state prisoner filed less than 
one federal habeas petition while each federal prisoner appears to 
have filed more than two such petitions.  The difference in filing rates 
cannot be explained by federal rules with regard to successive and 
fragmented habeas petitions because these rules, which discourage 
but do not prevent multiple petitions, apply equally to state and fed-
eral prisoners.  Part of the difference in filing rates may be explained 
by the fact that some state prisoners obtain relief from errors in their 
convictions or sentences by means of a state PCR motion and there-
fore do not file for federal habeas relief.  For those state prisoners de-
nied state PCR, a federal habeas petition is not as valuable as for fed-
eral prisoners because federal courts will respect to some extent state 
court judgments denying a state prisoner’s claims of error, even if 
those judgments are based on state procedure rather than federal con-
stitutional law.  The remainder of the difference in filing rates is 
likely attributable to the fact that, although Table 5 attempts to pre-
sent accurately the number of prisoners who can reasonably hope to 
obtain habeas relief before release, it may be incorrect or there may 
be federal prisoners who file without reasonable hope for timely re-
lief.  For example, if I have underestimated the time required for ha-
beas relief by a year, then the proper population of state prisoners 
who files is roughly 14 thousand.  If federal release policy is stricter 
than state release policy or all federal prisoners incarcerated past their 
direct appeal file for habeas relief, then the number of federal prison-
ers responsible for any given year’s habeas filings will rise.  For ex-
ample, if the proportion of federal prisoners who serve more than 
three years is similar to the proportion of state prisoners who serve 
more than three years, and this is the amount of time required for 
federal prisoner to obtain habeas relief or all federal prisoners who 
can file for habeas relief do so, then the relevant population of federal 
prisoners is roughly 5,900.   
                                                                                                                 
158 The numbers from which these statistics are derived are bolded in Table 4 to facilitate determi-
nation of the prisoner populations responsible for habeas filings in other years.  The statistics on filings 
are 78 percent of the bolded numbers in order to account for the share of federal filings by prisoners 
serving life sentences or on death row, prisoners who are not included in prison admissions numbers.  
See text accompanying note 157. 
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B.  Prisoners who pleaded guilty rarely file habeas petitions and their 
petitions are almost never granted 
To more precisely pin down the population responsible for fed-
eral habeas filings, Table 6 presents data from 1990-2000 on the 
number of defendants in federal criminal cases, the number of defen-
dants convicted of federal crimes, data on the manner in which they 
were convicted, and the number of defendants sentenced to incarcera-
tion.
159  The most important numbers are the high share of individuals 
who plead guilty and the share of individuals who opt for trial.  In 
1995, for example, these numbers were 92 percent and 8 percent, re-
spectively.  These numbers are important for three reasons.  First, the 
method of conviction determines the scope of claims available to 
prisoners in habeas petitions.  Individuals who plead guilty cannot, 
for the most part, assert errors that predate the plea or trial-type er-
rors.  Their claims are confined to sentencing errors.  The scope of 
claims in turn affects the time consumed by habeas filings from the 
perspective of both parties and the courts.  Second, and more relevant 
for my purposes, pre-AEDPA data suggest that 20-30 percent of fed-
eral habeas petitions filed by state prisoners are brought by prisoners 
who plead guilty.
160  Post-AEDPA data from the Eastern District of 
                                                                                                                 


























1990 58.70 47.49 28.66
1991 60.19 48.95 30.56
1992 63.12 52.35 46.13 0.88 0.52 5.09 0.61 34.35
1993 64.64 53.44 48.02 0.90 0.35 4.58 0.49 34.84
1994 61.40 50.70 45.96 0.91 0.39 3.86 0.50 33.02
1995 56.48 47.56 43.58 0.92 0.30 3.20 0.48 31.81
1996 61.43 53.08 48.69 0.92 0.28 3.62 0.48 36.37
1997 64.96 56.57 52.51 0.93 0.28 3.26 0.52 39.43
1998 76.95 68.16 64.56 0.95 0.38 2.57 0.65 43.04
1999 75.72 66.06 62.40 0.94 0.42 2.73 0.50 47.66
2000 76.95 68.16 64.56 0.95 0.38 2.57 0.65 50.45
Table 6.  Disposition of federal criminal cases. 
159 Analogous data on state prisoners is not readily available.  Nor is data on the manner of convic-
tion for federal defendants in 1990 and 1991. 
160 Flango, supra note 85 at 36; Robinson, supra note 153 at 7; Faust, Rubinstein & Yackle, The 
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New York suggest an even lower number: eight percent.
161  These 
data reduce significantly the number of prisoners responsible for 
most habeas filings.  Third, as I will demonstrate in the next subsec-
tion, the probability of having a petition granted conditional on the 
petitioner having pleaded guilty is virtually zero.
162
C.  The probability of a habeas petition ultimately being granted is 
larger than previously suggested 
The final empirical feature of PCR litigation relevant to habeas 
bargaining is the percentage of PCR petitions that are granted.  Only 
one study – sponsored by the National Center for State Courts – con-
tains data on outcomes in PCR litigation in state courts.  Looking at 
four states (Alabama, California, New York and Texas), that study 
found that 6.2 percent of state PCR claims involving non-capital sen-
tences were granted in 1992.
163  Table 7 reproduces a table from that 
study that breaks down this success rate by type of claim raised.  It 
reveals that the success rate varies dramatically across claims, rang-
                                                                                                                 
Great Writ in Action: Empirical, Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 637, 678 (1991).  Importantly, these estimates are based on data on federal habeas filings by 
state prisoners, not federal prisoners.   
161 For example, in the period 2001-2002, there were 296 cases, of which 24 were by prisoner who 
plead guilty.  Allocating these 24 across all methods of disposition in proportion the allocation of all 
cases across the methods of disposition, one finds – among cases where the prisoner did not plead – 18 
petitions which were stayed to permit the petitioner to exhaust state remedies and 23 that were time 
barred.  The numbers for the period 1996-2003 are 493 total cases, 39 where the prisoner plead guilty, 
29 stayed to exhaust, 29 time-barred, and 3 second and successive.   
162 Indeed, the data from  , combined with statistics on the number of federal prisoners with 
sentences long enough to obtain habeas relief from  , suggest that roughly 300 federal prisoners 
admitted in 1995 – the number of prisoners convicted after a trial – were responsible for at least 48 per-
cent of the habeas filings by federal prisoners in 1998 – roughly 4,100 petitions.  Even if one was to as-
sume only a three-year lag to federal relief or that all federal prisoners incarcerated past their direct ap-
peal file for habeas relief, the number would be at most 500 prisoners responsible for nearly eight peti-
tions each.  Of course, these estimates assume that defendants who plead serve sentences that are 
equally as long as those who are convicted following a trial.  This assumption is incorrect because the 
purpose of pleading guilty is to obtain a lower sentence.  Yet, even if all the 3,200 defendants convicted 
by trial were to have filed a habeas petition, that would still leave 900 petitions – more than one in 10 – 
unaccounted for.  Successive petitions or petitions that can be characterized as abuse of the writ cannot 
explain these petitions because these account for only five percent of issues filed in habeas petitions ac-
cording to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ pre-AEDPA numbers.  In the post-AEDPA data from the 
Eastern District of New York, the share of petitions dismissed as successive is 0.6 percent.  None were 
dismissed as an abuse of the writ.  (Three of 493 were dismissed as second or successive.)  This analysis 
suggests that there are a significant number of habeas filings whose source is not easily explained by the 
extant data.  While this is a most interesting puzzle, it is not the focus of this paper.  The main lesson to 
draw from this analysis for the purposes of this paper is that a small number of federal prisoners – 
roughly 300 hundred out of the 3,800 that have sentences less than life, plus all those with life or capital 
sentences, have meaningful habeas rights.  Extrapolating these numbers to state prisoners suggests 1,700 




163 Flango, supra note 85 at 62. 
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ing from one percent for Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims to 8 
percent for ineffective assistance claims and 11 percent for Eighth 
Amendment claims.
164
Data on federal habeas litigation initiated by state prisoners sug-
gest a lower rate of success – between one and four percent – than in 
state court.
165  The most recent pre-AEDPA study was the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics’ study of petitions filed by state prisoners disposed 
in 1992.  (These data include the federal court data from the four 
states in the National Center for State Courts study, plus data from 
federal courts in four other states.)  Ignoring dismissals for failure to 
exhaust, the Bureau’s study found that only 1.6 percent of petitions 
were granted.  This is not far off from estimates drawn from post-
AEDPA data on non-capital cases from the Eastern District of New 
York.  Those data suggest a success rate of 1.9 percent.  Of course 
these are unconditional numbers.  In the post-AEDPA data, none of 
the 40 petitions filed by prisoners who pleaded guilty were granted.  
This suggests a success rate of zero conditional on pleading guilty 
and 2.1 percent conditional on conviction by trial.  If one ignores 
cases that are dismissed for procedural reasons, on the basis that 
these cases are easily identified – and rejected – by prosecutors look-
                                                                                                                 
State courts Federal courts









Ineffective assistance of counsel 732 8 584 <1
Trial court error 528 6 378 2
Prosecutorial misconduct 199 3 206 <1
Fourth amendment 79 1 172 <1
Fift amendment 414 2 380 <1
Sixth amendment 220 1 224 <1
Eighth amendment 463 11 261 <1
Fourteenth amendment 728 7 426 1
Table 7.  Success rate of PCR petitions by court and claim raised (re-
produced from Victor E. Flango, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal 
Courts (National Center for State Courts) 62 (Table 17) (1994)). 
164 It should be noted that the high rate of success on Eighth Amendment claims can be attributed to 
a spate of excessive bail claims from New York.  Ignoring these, the success rate for Eighth Amendment 
claims probably falls significantly, though an exact number cannot be derived from the data presented in 
the study.  Flango, supra note 85 at 62-63.   
165 Id. at 62-63; Faust, Rubenstein & Yackle, supra note 160 at 681; Shapiro, Federal Habeas Cor-
pus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 333 (1973).  See also Robinson, supra note 153 at 
23, 35 (looking at success rate on appeal conditional on losing at the district court level).  One system-
atic exception is the set of capital cases.  They account, however, for a very small percentage of all ha-
beas cases.   
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art3  Habeas Settlements  61 
ing for habeas bargaining opportunities, then the success rate rises to 
2.7 percent in the pre-AEDPA data from the Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics.  It rises to 2.3 percent in the post-AEDPA data.
166   
So far the analysis of outcomes has focused on non-capital cases.  
Whereas state courts are more generous with PCR than federal courts 
in non-capital cases, this pattern is reversed in capital cases.  Accord-
ing to National Center for State Court data, petitioners on death row 
obtain relief in three percent of petitions they file in state court and 
17 percent of petitions they file in federal court.
167  This is much 
lower than the 6.2 percent success rate of non-capital petitioners in 
state court but much higher than the 1.6 percent pre-AEDPA success 
rate of non-capital petitioners in federal court.   
Together, the outcome statistics suggest two conclusions about 
outcomes.  First, the success rate is low, though perhaps not as low as 
suggested by other studies.  The probability of not obtaining relief at 
either the state or federal level is 92.2 percent pre-AEDPA and 91.9 
percent post-AEDPA in non-capital cases.  It is just 80 percent in 
capital cases.  Second, if one conditions on the nature of a peti-
tioner’s claims or whether his petition is procedurally defaulted – fea-
tures that are relatively easy to identify, then the probability of failing 
to obtain PCR falls even further, perhaps below 90 percent in non-
capital cases. 
 
                                                                                                                 
166 This figure is not conditional on prisoners convicted by trial. 
167 Flango, supra note 85 at 86. 
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APPENDIX C: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 35 
The text below should be appended to Federal Rule 35 (Correct-
ing or Reducing a Sentence) of Criminal Procedure.  The language is 
modeled on Rules 11(b) and 35(b).  It was drafted with an eye to § 
2255 motions by federal prisoners.  State analogues should allow for 
settlement of motions for post-conviction review under the appropri-
ate state statute and under § 2254.   
(c) Reducing a Sentence pursuant to a Settlement of a 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 Motion. 
(1) In General.  Upon the government’s motion, the court may reduce 
a sentence if the defendant agrees to voluntarily dismiss a pending 
petition under 28 U.S.C. §2255. 
(2) Below Statutory Minimum. When acting under Rule 35(b), the 
court may reduce the sentence to a level below the minimum sentence 
established by statute. 
(3) Considering and Accepting a Settlement of § 2255 motion. 
(A) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court 
accepts a settlement of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the prisoner 
may be placed under oath, and the court must address the prisoner 
personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform 
the prisoner of, and determine that the prisoner understands, the fol-
lowing: 
(i) the right to persist with his or her §2255 motion; 
(ii) the right to have the motion considered by the district 
court; 
(iii) the defendant's waiver of these rights to collateral review 
if the court accepts a the settlement; 
(iv) the right to advise of counsel during the negotiation and 
finalization of the settlement; 
(v) the right to challenge the settlement as the product of inef-
fective assistance of counsel; 
(vi) the nature of each claim proffered to support the pris-
oner’s § 2255 motion; 
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(vii) the maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, 
fine, and term of supervised release to which the prisoner is 
subject if the district court denies the § 2255 motion; 
(viii) the minimum penalty to which the prisoner is subject if 
the § 2255 motion is granted in part or in full; 
(ix) the penalty to which the prisoner is subject if the court 
grants the government’s motion to reduce the prisoner’s sen-
tence; and 
(x) the terms of any settlement provision waiving the right 
subsequently to collaterally attack the sentence imposed by 
the district court pursuant to the settlement, save and except 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(B) Ensuring That a Settlement Is Voluntary. Before accepting 
a settlement of a § 2255 motion, the court must address the prisoner 
personally in open court and determine that the settlement is volun-
tary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than 
promises in the settlement agreement). 
(C) Determining the Factual Basis for a Settlement. Before 
entering judgment on a settlement, the court must determine that the 
prisoner’s § 2255 motion contains a colorable claim under that pro-
vision. 
(4) Withdrawing from a settlement. A defendant may withdraw con-
sent to a settlement of a § 2255 motion: 
(A) before the court accepts the settlement, for any reason or 
no reason; or 
(B) after the court accepts the settlement, but before it im-
poses sentence if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for 
requesting the withdrawal. 
(5) Finality of a Settlement. After the court imposes sentence, the 
prisoner may not withdraw consent to a settlement, and the settle-
ment may be set aside only on collateral attack for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 
(6) Recording the Proceedings. The proceedings during which the 
prisoner enters a settlement must be recorded by a court reporter or 
by a suitable recording device.  The record must include the inquiries 
and advice to the prisoner required under Rule 35(c)(3)(A). 
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(7) Harmless Error. A variance from the requirements of this rule is 
harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights. 
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